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ABSTRACT 
CREATING THE LITMUS TEST:  ABORTION, MAINLINE PROTESTANTS, 
AND THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 
Sabrina Danielsen 
Melissa Wilde 
Scholars and laypeople have become concerned that American religion and 
politics has increasingly divided between conservatives and liberals, resulting in a “culture 
war” that leaves little common ground on salient social issues. Drawing on archival and 
periodical sources and a comparative-historical research design, I seek to understand the 
causes and consequences of the shifting relationship between religion and politics by 
examining how large, moderate and mainstream Protestant institutions have struggled to 
maintain cohesion and prestige throughout the increasingly contentious politics of 
abortion. In the early-1960s, no Mainline Protestant institutions supported expanding 
abortion access. Over 1966-1972, all the same institutions released official 
pronouncements in support of expanding abortion access. Since this time, particularly 
from 1987-1992, all these institutions faced increased internal debate over the issue and 
shifted in conservative directions to varying degrees. I find that the debate around 
abortion among Mainline Protestant institutions was not generally characterized by 
polarization around two sides but rather by much consensus, change over time, 
ambiguity, and often ambivalence toward the issue. These stances have often emerged 
not out of existing worldview and attitudes, but rather out of existing social networks, 
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awareness of stances by others in the religious field, and institutional self-interest. 
Protestant clergy who put in significant time, energy and personal risk into expanding 
abortion access for women in the late-1960s and early-1970s were pulled into the 
movement through existing activist social networks, particularly from the Civil Rights 
Movement, and attitudes towards other issues such as civil rights, social injustice, and civil 
disobedience. During the 1960s and 1970s, Mainline Protestant institutions mobilized 
around support for expanding abortion rights as a way of challenging the political power 
of Catholic institutions, which were the primary opponent to expanding abortion access. 
Over the 1980s, as Evangelical Protestants became increasingly engaged in pro-life 
politics, Mainline Protestants began to see them as the primary opponent to expanding 
abortion access. Those denominations that sought to create greater ties with Evangelical 
Protestants backed away from their support of choice, while those denominations that 
sought to distinguish themselves from Evangelicals remained support of choice despite 
strong pro-life grassroots movements within them.  
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INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW 
In recent decades, scholars and laypeople alike have become concerned that 
American religion and politics are increasingly divided between conservatives and 
liberals, resulting in a “culture war” that leaves little common ground on salient social 
issues. While religious affiliation, especially whether one was Protestant, Catholic, or 
Jewish, played a defining role in Americans’ public identities before the 1960s (Herberg 
1955), after the 1960s salient boundaries increasingly cut across denominational lines and 
are defined by a growing divide between liberals and conservatives (Wuthnow 1988). 
With this religious “restructuring,” mainstream denominations have been less able to hold 
the middle ground that they historically maintained. As a result, mainstream 
denominations have become more internally polarized and have declined in political 
power and members. In this project, I seek to understand the causes and consequences of 
these shifting religious boundaries and how these large, moderate, mainstream Protestant 
institutions have struggled to maintain cohesion during the rise of contentious salient 
social issues 
Abortion is arguably the most contentious issue that has divided American 
religious groups since the 1960s. As the battle lines in abortion politics have grown 
increasingly concretized over time and Evangelical Protestants have played an 
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increasingly prominent role in pro-life1 politics, it is often assumed that Protestants in 
general are predominantly mobilized against abortion and that they always have been. 
Despite the multitude of research on the history of abortion politics in the United States, 
no study has examined how large mainstream religious institutions engaged with the 
abortion debate. Research has mostly looked at activists and institutions on the extremes 
of the debate, generally overlooking how the large, moderate institutions were being torn 
apart in the middle. When religious institutions are mentioned, it is brief and their views 
are assumed to be static. This project seeks to correct this neglect and the 
misunderstandings that it gives rise to by detailing the shifting among large, moderate 
Protestant institutions’ views in the abortion debate and their dynamic struggles to 
maintain authority and internal cohesion despite the increasingly divisive politics of 
abortion. 
Contentious issues, such as abortion, provide a key site for examining both how 
flexible religious boundaries are and how religious institutions continually renegotiate 
these boundaries. Although the underlying reasons for the religious realignment since the 
1960s are structural changes in American public life (Wuthnow 1988), one key way that 
religious realignment occurred and became salient was through shifting institutional 
mobilization and alliances on abortion. In the 1960s and 1970s, Protestants allied 
themselves with Jewish groups over pro-choice politics against Catholics who were 
staunchly anti-abortion. Starting in the 1980s, realignment occurred as liberal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Terminology in the abortion debate is deeply contested and politicized by both sides. I will refer to each 
movement by its chosen label even though each side contests the label of the other. After 1973, I will refer 
to the pro-life and pro-choice movements. Before 1973, these labels were not widely used and I will use the 
terms anti-abortion and pro-abortion rights. 
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Protestants, liberal Catholics, and liberal Jews teamed up over pro-choice politics and 
conservative Protestants, conservative Catholics, and conservative Jews teamed up over 
pro-life politics. I argue that the realignment occurred through a process of arguing over 
contentious and salient social issues. While abortion fights did not create the religious 
realignment, these fights did (1) allow these shifting boundaries to become salient to 
people and institutions and (2) provide the institutional connections and rationale for 
shifting the boundaries. Wuthnow (1988) has explained why religious realignment 
occurred, and this project provides a key explanation for how religious realignment 
occurred. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This project’s central question is how and why Mainline Protestant stances on 
abortion have shifted since 1960. In the following three chapters, I draw primarily on 
archival and periodical sources and a comparative-historical research design to address 
this overall question by exploring three related empirical questions. First, why did 
Protestants initially get involved in the contemporary abortion debate in the 1960s? By 
examining the key social movement organization that motivated Mainline Protestant 
leaders to become involved in the abortion rights movement, I found that existing activist 
social network relationships, especially from the Civil Rights Movement, led Protestant 
leaders into taking action on abortion issues.  This first chapter is the most theoretically 
and empirically distinct of the dissertation chapters but provides the necessary context for 
the abortion debate discussed in the remaining chapters. It is also a critical chapter to 
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challenge popular assumptions of Protestant conservatism and stasis on abortion by 
describing a period in American history when Protestants were radically liberal and 
engaged in civil disobedience in support of greater abortion access. 
Second, how did the debate around abortion rights shift for Mainline Protestant 
institutions over time? I look at official stances among a sample of eight denominations 
over time and demonstrate surprising homogeneity in timing and scope of statements 
among all denominations. The “legitimate” and normal stance on abortion among 
Mainline Protestant denominations shifted from leaning left to leaning right and these 
stances became increasingly internally controversial within the institutions. 
Third, why did Mainline Protestant stances shift as they did over time? I examine 
why some denominations shifted more substantially than others. Using archival and 
periodical sources from a sample of eight Mainline Protestant denominations, as well as 
the leading interdenominational abortion rights social movement organization, I 
demonstrate that religious institutions shifted stances according to changes in the wider 
institutional field. I find that religious institutions use stances on controversial social issues 
as a way to navigate salient symbolic boundaries in the religious field. Today, those 
groups that have sought to build greater ecumenical ties with evangelicals have backed 
away from their support of choice on abortion while those groups that have sought to 
distinguish themselves from evangelicals have maintained their support of choice despite 
great controversy. 
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RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES 
 Scholars see the United States as having an especially entangled relationship 
between religion and politics. The most influential study of American religion and politics 
comes from Tocqueville, who came to the United States from France in the 1830s seeking 
to understand America, as the first truly modern state.  He came to understand religion, 
democratic participation, and family as the key ways American citizens are educated to 
think beyond one’s individual private world and engage with their community. He argues 
that religion not only has a strong direct effect on American law, but that “its indirect 
action seems to me much greater still, and it is just when it is not speaking of freedom at 
all that it best teaches the Americans the art of being free…[religion] does direct mores, 
and by regulating domestic life it helps to regulate the state” (Tocqueville 1969: 290-291). 
 Scholars have consistently shown that religion is a defining and unifying feature of 
American public life. While Americans continue to see the separation of church and state 
as central (Thomson 2010), religion is also a central way that Americans become involved 
in their community and their wider society, and it is seen as important and necessary in 
the public sphere (Bellah et al. 1985). An elaborate and well-institutionalized civil religion 
exists in America. This civil religion was initially shaped by the founding fathers and has 
cultural roots in Protestant Christianity and sacred symbols from national history, but 
remains a nonsectarian faith (Bellah 1970). Religious identity has been shown to be a 
crucial part of civic identity. Even in contemporary United States, as a growing number 
of Americans have no religious affiliation (Hout and Fischer 2002), atheists remain 
distrusted “others.” Atheists are less likely to be accepted publicly and privately than any 
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other religious minority group, even Muslims in the post-September 11th world, and 
tolerance for atheists is not increasing as it is for other minority groups (Edgell et al. 
2006). 
 While religion has a unifying role in American public life, it also has had a divisive 
role. Before the 1960s, denominational affiliation, especially whether one was Protestant, 
Catholic, or Jewish, played a defining role in American public identities due to the history 
of American immigration and the relationship between religion and ethnicity (Herberg 
1955). Sociologists have long been interested in the “social sources of denominationalism” 
and divisions in the American religious field, pointing especially to inequality based in 
race and class (Niebuhr 1929; Herberg 1955; Roof and McKinney 1987; Darnell and 
Sherkat 1997; Sherkat 2001; Park and Reimer 2002; Smith and Faris 2005). Although 
these divides of denominationalism in inequality remain today, the salient symbolic 
boundaries in the religious field are no longer between denominations as they long have 
been. 
 The religious and political landscape has shifted greatly since Herberg’s time in 
the 1950s and salient divides in the religious field now cut within religious denominations 
between liberals and conservatives. Wuthnow (1988) argues that a religious realignment 
occurred after the social turmoil of the 1960s, in which the growth of the federal 
government, the differential expansion of higher education, changing technology, and the 
proliferation of religious “special purpose groups” have caused the middle to collapse to 
leave a growing divide between liberals and conservatives. Wuthnow argues that because 
of this liberal and conservative split, civil religion is no longer the unifying feature it was 
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once. In Wuthnow’s conception, social structure in the United States has altered the 
symbolic boundaries within the religious field, which, in turn, impacts the wider political 
sphere. 
 With this religious “restructuring,” denominations have been less able to hold the 
middle ground that they historically have maintained and have become less cohesive and 
more internally polarized. Over the past several decades, large mainstream and moderate 
Protestant denominations have declined in political power and membership. To their 
right, conservative Protestant denominations have grown in numbers (Iannaccone 1994; 
Hout et al. 2001; Finke and Stark 2005) and non-denominational mega-churches have 
gained membership and clout within religious and political spheres (Ellingson 2007). To 
their left, an increasing proportion of Americans identify as having no religious 
preference. This change is not due to demographic shifts or secularization. Rather, these 
religious “nones” are political moderates and liberals with weak religious affiliation who 
no longer identify with organized religion since it has become increasingly linked to the 
conservative agenda of the Religious Right (Hout and Fischer 2002; Putnam and 
Campbell 2010). 
 As the middle has collapsed and the religious field has grown increasingly 
polarized, some have argued that American is in the midst of a culture war that affects 
public policy and the lives of all Americans. Hunter (1991) argues that there is a culture 
war in America over how to define reality, America’s past, and America’s future that is 
created by divergent sources of moral authority. Conservatives depend upon an external, 
transcendent authority, while liberals find authority in a variety of sources that are 
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recontextualized to fit modern life. Hunter (1991) agrees with Wuthnow (1988) that there 
is a religious restructuring with liberals of all faith traditions joining up against 
conservatives of all faith traditions:  
At the heart of the new cultural realignment are the pragmatic alliances being 
formed across faith traditions. Because of common points of vision and concern, 
the orthodox wings of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are forming 
associations with each other, as are the progressive wings of each faith 
community—and each set of alliances takes form in opposition to the influence 
the other seeks to exert in public culture. (Hunter 1991: 47) 
 
This project argues that abortion politics, in particular, provided a critical rationale for 
creating these religious alliances across religious traditions and oppositions between 
liberals and conservatives.  
 There has been much debate in recent decades about the extent to which 
American religious institutions and American society more generally are polarized, with 
most research agreeing that Americans are less polarized on the individual-level and more 
polarized on the institutional-level. The majority of empirical work studying this 
polarization has focused on individual-level political beliefs from surveys, some finding 
support for greater polarization (Carroll and Marler 1995; Bolce and De Maio 1999; 
Layman 1999; Brooks 2000; Wellman 2008), but most finding that Americans are no 
more polarized than previously (Davis and Robinson 1996; DiMaggio et al. 1996; 
Hoffmann and Miller 1998; McConkey 2001; Baker 2005; Fiorina et al. 2011). However, 
while most theorists agree that the culture war does not primarily exist at the individual-
level, they do generally believe it exists at the institutional level (Wuthnow 1988; Hunter 
1991; Williams 1997; DiMaggio 2003). Hunter (1991) argues that it is important to 
“make a distinction between how these moral visions are institutionalized in different 
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organizations and in public rhetoric and how ordinary Americans relate to them,” since 
“the culture war is ultimately fought in political institutions, not in the attitudes found in 
surveys” (Hunter 1991: 43, 170). While there is agreement that great polarization exists at 
the institutional level, there is relatively little research looking at polarization among 
institutions. This project aims to fill both empirical and theoretical gaps in this literature 
by studying a divisive religious and political issue within institutions, rather than through 
surveys of political opinion, to better understand how and why there has been growing 
polarization within American religion and politics and how religious institutions deal with 
contentious social problems. 
 There has been growing polarization between religious denominations over 
political issues in general (Roof and McKinney 1987; Wuthnow 1988), but abortion has 
been especially polarizing within denominations, particularly since the 1980s, both at the 
individual and at the institutional levels (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Hoffmann and Miller 
1998; McConkey 2001; Bolzendahl and Brooks 2005; Hoffmann and Johnson 2005).  
While research has examined how abortion has become a key social problem around 
which individuals have defined their political and religious identity, no one has studied 
how religious institutions have defined their identity around abortion, as this project does. 
 Sociologists of religion have long studied how religious groups have addressed 
controversial social and political issues. Scholars have written about why and how 
religious groups have dealt with issues such as temperance and abolition (Gusfield 1963; 
Young 2002; Young 2006); women’s ordination (Chaves 1996; Chaves 1997); birth 
control (Wilde and Danielsen 2013); and environmentalism (Danielsen 2013). Others 
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have studied how multiple social issues are institutionalized within a particular religious 
institution, such as the Southern Baptist Convention (Ammerman 1995) and the Roman 
Catholic Church (Wilde 2004; Wilde 2007), or within congregations and special-interest 
religious organizations (Becker 1999; Dillon 1999; Moon 2004; Edgell 2005). However, 
there remains no comprehensive study of how religious groups have addressed the issue of 
abortion over time. 
  
ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 Abortion has grown increasingly controversial since 1960 within both political 
and religious institutions, shifting from an uncommonly discussed issue in the early-1960s 
to a core litmus test upon which millions of Americans base their voting patterns since the 
late-1980s (Fiorina et al. 2011). Although today the Religious Right, the Republican 
Party, and conservative stances on abortion are markers of Protestant involvement in 
politics—in fact, Protestant stances on abortion in the beginning of the modern abortion 
debate were liberal and subsequently defined by much ambiguity, ambivalence, and 
change.  
 Although abortion is a highly contentious issue in modern American politics, this 
has not always been the case.  Abortion has risen and fallen as a social problem in the 
United States. Before the 1850s, abortion was not defined as a social problem and was 
widely tolerated. The issue grew in contention in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, especially from 1860-1880, when American physicians led a movement to 
restrict the availability of abortion to raise the prestige of their profession (Mohr 1978; 
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Luker 1984; Ginsburg 1989; Burns 2005) and in response to fears about differential birth 
rates and declining White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) power (Beisel and Kay 2004). 
American physicians successfully defined abortion as a public problem, which resulted in 
state legislatures criminalizing abortion. After this elite movement, there emerged a 
“century of silence” about abortion issues, during which there was very little discussion, 
except among Catholics, of what was seen as primarily a medical issue handled by 
physicians (Luker 1984). 
 Starting in the early-1960s, some legislators and physicians began to argue for 
abortion law reform (Luker 1984; Burns 2005). Moreover, the 1965 Supreme Court 
decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, which decriminalized birth control among married 
persons, sparked reformers to advocate for this decriminalization to extend to abortion. 
Physicians again began to define abortion as a public problem and again successfully 
lobbied state legislatures. However, this time the physicians and elite-led reformers sought 
to ease the very legislative restrictions around abortion that were put in place by the 
profession’s previous campaign. Interestingly, liberalization was especially likely in the 
South because there were fewer Catholics, the key anti-abortion constituency (Burns 
2005). These reforms were largely seen as uncontroversial and sensible and were 
primarily focused on medical authority.  
 The contentiousness of abortion increased and state legislative reform completely 
stopped in 1970, as a broader feminist movement increasingly argued that abortion 
should not be decided by physicians, but rather by women themselves (Burns 2005). Since 
reproductive control is the “single most important factor in the material basis of women’s 
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emancipation in the course of the last century” (Gordon 1976), feminists recognized the 
important implications of shifting abortion laws. Feminist social movement organizations, 
including NARAL, which was created in 1969 as the National Association for the Repeal 
of Abortion Laws, argued that existing abortion law reform did not go far enough, but 
rather women had a right to abortions, unrestrained by physicians.  
  In 1973, the United States Supreme Court took the debate out of state 
legislatures and sought to resolve the issue at the federal level in their Roe v. Wade and Doe 
v. Bolton decisions, which decriminalized abortion in the first trimester. Immediately after 
the decision, anti-abortion social movement organizations mobilized, primarily composed 
of Catholic Democrats, and pro-abortion-rights social movement organizations 
professionalized (Staggenborg 1988; Staggenborg 1991). Although Catholics immediately 
mobilized in anti-abortion social movement organizations, Protestants did not mobilize 
en mass against abortion until the early-1980s (Luker 1984; Ginsburg 1989). While 
pundits often casually refer to Protestants mobilizing against abortion after 1973 (i.e. 
Brooks 2012), this project refutes that assertion by showing the extent of Protestant 
mobilization in support of abortion access after 1973. Protestants did not begin to mobilize 
against abortion until the late-1970s and early-1980s as Evangelical Protestants began 
mobilizing in the political sphere and this new Religious Right engaged in abortion 
politics in particular. 
 As Evangelical Protestants mobilized over abortion, abortion became increasingly 
central in partisan politics. In the 1970s, abortion was not a defining issue for either 
political party, especially because the anti-abortion Catholic activists that were mobilized 
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were predominantly Democrats (Ferree et al. 2002; Maxwell 2002), a political party that 
also received support from feminist groups. In the 1980s, as Protestants began to mobilize 
against abortion and as the Religious Right, a predominantly Protestant phenomenon, 
became an increasingly dominant wing within the Republican Party, they helped push 
the Republican Party in general to embrace a pro-life stance. President Ronald Reagan, 
in particular, did much to marry the Religious Right, Republicans, and an anti-abortion 
stance (Ferree et al. 2002). Over this same time, pro-choice social movement 
organizations increasingly aligned themselves with Democrats. As the two major political 
parties have coalesced around opposite stances on abortion, abortion politics have 
increasingly focused on partisan fights in Congress, state legislatures, and on presidential 
elections that can affect the composition of the Supreme Court (Burns 2005). Although 
many scholars have explored the increasing evangelical Protestant engagement with pro-
life politics over this time, there is much less understanding of how the large, mainstream 
Protestant institutions that were long in support of choice on abortion dealt with this 
change.  
 There is extensive literature about how the frames around abortion issues have 
shifted through time, an important topic since, as Luker (1984) argues, the abortion 
debate is not about “fact,” but about how to weigh, measure and assess these facts. 
However, most scholarship has focused on activists at the extremes (Luker 1984; 
Ginsburg 1989; Staggenborg 1991; Maxwell 2002; Rohlinger 2006) rather than on more 
mainstream, long-standing institutions. Also, although scholars have noted the moral and 
religious undertones of the framing of abortion issues since Roe v. Wade, no one has 
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focused on abortion politics primarily within religious institutions over time, as I will do in 
this dissertation. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This project’s central question is how and why Mainline Protestant 
institutionalized stances on abortion have shifted since 1960 and it seeks to shed light on 
the causes and consequences of religious restructuring and the rise in salience of culture 
war issues in politics. I employ a historical-comparative approach by comparing the 
largest and most prominent Mainline Protestant denominations as well as their ties to 
other organizations such as religious and political special-interest groups from 1960 to 
today. 
I examine the largest Mainline Protestant denominations: American Baptist 
Churches in the USA, Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Churches in America, 
Presbyterian Church (USA), United Church of Christ, and United Methodist Church. 
These are the denominations that scholars study when they focus on Mainline Protestants 
(see, for example, the edited volume Wuthnow and Evans 2002) and are all 
denominations with a large number of members and a long history within the United 
States. Two denominations were formed from mergers over this time period and so I also 
study their key predecessor groups. First, the Presbyterian Church (USA) was formed out 
of a 1983 merger through the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and 
Presbyterian Church in the United States, both of which are in my sample. Second, the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America was formed in 1988 and I study two key 
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predecessor groups, the American Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in America.2 
In sum, my sample includes eight Mainline Protestant denominations in 1960 that 
correspond to six groups today (See Table 1). 
TABLE 1: SAMPLE DENOMINATIONS3 
Denomination Origin Date in 
the US 
Membership  
in 1971 
Membership 
in 2010 American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. 1814 1.6 million 1.3 million 
Episcopal Church 1789 3.2 million 2.0 million 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America   4.3 million 
        American Lutheran Church 1845 2.5 million  
        Lutheran Church in America 1820 3.1 million  
Presbyterian Church (USA)   2.7 million 
        United Presbyterian Church in the 
U.S.A. 
1789 3.0 million  
        Presbyterian Church in the United 
States 
1861 0.9 million  
United Church of Christ 1620 1.9 million 1.1 million 
United Methodist Church 1784 10.5 million 7.7 million 
 
 This project looks at these Mainline Protestant denominations through their 
official archives and their official periodicals. For each denomination, I look at internal 
institutional documents from the official denominational archives (see Table 2). Through 
correspondence, meeting minutes, and other official denominational documents, I 
examine who the key actors were on each side of the debate, what their interests might 
have been, and whether, how, and why the denomination has forged connections with 
other religious and political organizations on the issue. Archival analysis of each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Evangelical Lutheran Church in America has three predecessor groups: American Lutheran Church, 
Lutheran Church in America, and Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches. Whereas the first two 
Lutheran predecessor denominations each had over 2 million members at the time of the merger, the third 
had just 100,000 members. Whereas the first two Lutheran predecessor denominations each had prominent 
denominational periodicals, both had abortion stances, and both had prominent records in the current 
denominational archive, the latter was less institutionally robust. Thus, I study the American Lutheran 
Church and Lutheran Church in America, but not Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches.  
3 All origin dates obtained from (Melton 2009) or (Atwood et al. 2005). Membership data obtained from 
(Jacquct 1973) and (Lindner 2012). 
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denomination was supplemented by analysis of articles about abortion in their official 
periodicals, looking especially at years around key shifts in denominational abortion 
stances.   
 This project also looks at larger ecumenical institutions of which the Mainline 
Protestant institutions were a part. I coded all articles on abortion in Christian Century, 
Mainline Protestantism’s flagship journal. To better understand the Clergy Consultation 
Service on Abortion, the key ecumenical social movement organization that pulled 
Protestants into the abortion debate before 1973, I studied their archival materials as well 
as writing by leaders in the movement. To better understand the Religious Coalition for 
Abortion Rights, the key ecumenical pro-choice special interest group that Mainline 
Protestants were official members of from 1973 to today, I studied their official archives 
and official periodical, Options.  
 
17 
 
Table	  2:	  Data	  Sources	  for	  Religious	  Institutions 
Religious Institution Archive Periodicals 
American Baptist 
Churches in the U.S.A. 
American Baptist Historical 
Society (Atlanta, GA) 
Foundations (1960-1982); American 
Baptist Quarterly (1982-Present); 
Crusader (1960-1970); The American 
Baptist (1970-1992); American 
Baptists in Mission (1992-2005) 
Episcopal Church Archives of the Episcopal Church (Austin, TX) 
The Living Church (1960-Present); 
Episcopalian (1960-1990); 
Episcopalian Life (1990-Present) 
Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America; 
American Lutheran 
Church; and Lutheran 
Church in America 
Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America Archive 
(Elk Grove Village, IL) 
American Lutheran Church:The 
Lutheran Standard (1960-1987); 
Lutheran Church in America:  
The Lutheran (1960-1987); 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America: Lutheran (1988-Present) 
Presbyterian Church 
(USA); United 
Presbyterian Church in 
the U.S.A.; Presbyterian 
Church in the United 
States 
Presbyterian Historical 
Society (Philadelphia, PA) 
United Presbyterian Church in the 
U.S.A.: Presbyterian Life (1960-
1972); A.D. (1972-1995); 
Presbyterian Church in the United 
States: Presbyterian Survey (1960-
1995); Presbyterian Church (USA): 
Presbyterians Today (1995-Present) 
United Church of Christ United Church of Christ Archives (Cleveland, OH) 
United Church Herald (1960-1972), 
A.D. (1972-1985), United Church 
News (1985-Present) 
United Methodist 
Church 
United Methodist Archives 
and History Center 
(Madison, NJ) 
Christian Advocate (1960-Present) 
Clergy Consultation 
Service on Abortion 
Charles Deering McCormick 
Library of Special 
Collections at Northwestern 
University (Evanston, IL) 
and University of Illinois at 
Chicago Special Collections 
(Chicago, IL) 
 
Religious Coalition for 
Abortion Rights 
United Methodist Archives 
and History Center 
(Madison, NJ) 
Options (1973-Present) 
Ecumenical Mainline 
Protestant resources  Christian Century (1960-Present) 
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ROADMAP 
 Chapter 1 seeks to understand why thousands of Mainline Protestant clergy 
invested time, energy and personal risk to engage in civil disobedience in support of 
expanding abortion access in the late-1960s and early-1970s. I find that Protestant leaders 
were pulled into taking action on abortion issues through existing activist social networks, 
especially from the Civil Rights Movement. I argue that existing social movements 
facilitate the creation of new social movements by providing existing frames about social 
problems, tactics to address those social problems, and social relationships to encourage 
and pressure potential participants into action on a new issue. Chapter 1 is the most 
empirically differentiated from the rest of the dissertation, but is an important precursor 
to the chapters that come after it. The clergy involved in the early abortion rights social 
movement were predominately Mainline Protestant and members of the same 
denominations that suddenly advocated for abortion access from 1966-1972, as I describe 
in Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter also challenges common assumptions that religious 
stances on abortion are static or naturally conservative by describing a time in which 
many in both religious and secular circles assumed that Protestants were generally liberal 
on abortion. 
 Chapter 2 asks how the debate around abortion transformed among Mainline 
Protestant institutions over time. I look at Mainline Protestant denominations’ official 
stances on abortion from 1960 to today and find significant shifting in views on abortion 
over time. However, I also find much homogeneity in timing and scope of statements 
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among all Mainline Protestant institutions. Before the early-1960s, none of the Mainline 
Protestant denominations supported abortion access. From 1966-1972, all of the large 
Mainline Protestant institutions released pronouncements in favor of choice on abortion. 
From 1987-1992, all of these same denominations reexamined their abortion stances and 
shifted to varying degrees. I find that debate around abortion in Mainline Protestant 
institutions is not generally characterized by polarization on two sides, but rather is 
composed of much gray area, consensus, and change over time. However, I also find that 
consensus around the idea that Mainline Protestant denominations should engage in pro-
choice politics has declined over the 1980s and conflict has arisen. 
 Chapter 3 seeks to understand why Mainline Protestant abortion stances shifted in 
tandem with one another as they did, with the shifts in 1966-1972 marked by consensus 
and the shifts from 1987-1992 marked by much controversy. Moreover, why did two 
Mainline Protestant denominations diverge from the general pattern of other 
denominations from 1987-1992 in no longer explicitly supporting choice on abortion? I 
find that abortion fights were sites where religious groups renegotiated boundaries 
between themselves and other groups. During the first wave of abortion pronouncements, 
from 1966-1972, Mainline Protestants used abortion as an issue to join with Jewish 
groups and challenge Catholic political power more broadly.  During the second wave of 
abortion pronouncements, from 1987-1992, Mainline Protestants used abortion as an 
issue to distinguish or unite themselves with Evangelical Protestant institutions. I argue 
that institutionalized stances on controversial issues do not simply emerge out of 
worldview and sources of moral authority, as many culture war scholars would argue, but 
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rather are a key way that institutions construct boundaries around themselves and others. 
For Mainline Protestants, stances on abortion have provided the rationale and legitimacy 
for both institutional connections and institutional oppositions and are a key tool to 
facilitation religious restructuring. The salience of culture war issues is not simply an 
outcome of religious restructuring, but is a key way that religious restructuring occurred 
and became salient. 
 The Conclusion reflects again on the popular image of a polarizing and enduring 
culture war raging among Americans based on different worldviews, as described by 
scholars such as Hunter (1991) and by pundits. I argue against this traditional culture war 
thesis, pointing out the way that abortion debate among Mainline Protestant institutions 
is marked by much consensus, moderation, change over time, and that stances emerge 
instead out of existing social networks, awareness of stances by others in the religious field, 
and institutional self-interest. I argue for an understanding of the culture war as not being 
at the level of individual attitudes and worldviews, but rather at the level of institutions, 
social networks, and identities.  
 
 
 
21 
 
CHAPTER 1: MOBILIZING ON ABORTION: SOCIAL NETWORKS, CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE AND THE CLERGY CONSULTATION SERVICE ON 
ABORTION, 1960-1973 
INTRODUCTION 
 Although today Protestants are often perceived as predominately politically 
conservative and mobilized in anti-abortion politics, this was not always the case. In the 
beginning of the contemporary abortion debates in the 1960s and early-1970s, 
Protestants saw the issue of abortion access as an important social problem, one that they 
thought religious institutions and leaders should address.  Before the U.S. Supreme Court 
decriminalized abortion across the country in their 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, thousands 
of Protestant clergy helped connect over 100,000 women with doctors willing to provide 
often-illegal abortions. These clergy dedicated significant time and energy to developing 
the extensive social networks needed to achieve their goal: abortion access for women. In 
doing so, they also risked prosecution and faced challenges to their leadership within their 
own congregations. Why did Protestants get involved in the abortion debate and put 
significant time, energy and personal risk into expanding abortion access for women in 
the late-1960s and early-1970s?  By examining the key social movement organization that 
got Mainline Protestant leaders involved in the abortion rights movement, I found that 
Protestant leaders were pulled into taking action on abortion issues through existing 
activist social networks, especially from the Civil Rights Movement. 
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The Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion   
 In May 1967, a group of New York City clergy, predominantly Mainline 
Protestants, joined together to create a network that provided information to women 
about licensed physicians who were willing to provide abortions. This network, the Clergy 
Consultation Service on Abortion (CCS), referred women to providers who would 
perform generally illegal abortions in the years before abortion was decriminalized in the 
United States. Clergy connecting women to licensed physicians provided a much safer 
alternative to the ways that most women were accessing abortions at that time: 
middlemen connecting them to unlicensed practitioners who often demanded exorbitant 
prices and sometimes sexual favors (Lader 1966; Reagan 1997; Gorney 1998). 
 After this first Clergy Consultation Service in New York City was formed, clergy 
in other locales around the country began to form networks in their own cities.  In 
Chicago, the Clergy Consultation Service on Problem Pregnancy, formed in December 
1968, quietly helped an estimated 500 women over the course of the next year (Rockey 
1969). Initially, the organization, worked behind the scenes, not going public until 
December 1969, when it listed its number in the phone book and the Chicago Sun-Times 
published an exclusive full-page spread on the organization. Part of the delay was a 
concern about the legal ramifications of such an organization for the participating clergy. 
As E. Spencer Parsons, the founder of the Chicago CCS and an American Baptist pastor 
at the University of Chicago’s Rockefeller Memorial Chapel, wrote in May 1969 about 
installing a telephone line for the network in the Chapel: “I would be less than candid 
with you if I didn’t acknowledge that this information [about abortion providers] runs 
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either very close to or in direct violation of the law.”4 However, the biggest reason that 
the Chicago CCS delayed going public was the sheer logistical obstacles of gearing up for 
such a wide network. The Chicago CCS had to be ready for thousands of women to call 
in and to meet with various trained clergy members who could provide contact 
information of licensed physicians in the United States and abroad who were willing to 
provide safe abortions to women, despite many local laws criminalizing abortions.  
 On October 6, 1969, twenty-seven predominantly Mainline Protestant members 
of the Chicago CCS gathered to discuss details about their new network that was about to 
go public. The consensus was that the group was not prepared to make a public 
announcement about their group in the newspaper although Rev. Parsons had been 
successful in setting up a telephone number for women to call. They discussed in this 
meeting how the group would not make any more referrals within Illinois, because “the 
legal risks are too high,” and instead they would send the women out-of-state so that 
prosecutorial confusion about jurisdiction might help them escape prosecution. They 
were particularly on edge because a thirty-year-old Presbyterian minister, Rev. Robert 
W. Hare, involved in the Cleveland CCS, was under indictment in Massachusetts for 
sending a woman there. The Chicago CCS struggled in this October 1969 meeting to 
find appropriate doctors to whom they should send women. They could not send women 
to New York for the time being because of a Grand Jury investigation into the New York 
City CCS, initiated after a Brooklyn District Attorney intercepted two girls in a doctor’s 
office. The Chicago CCS sent many women to Michigan, but discussed how they should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Letter from E. Spencer Parsons to Edward H. Levi, Office of the President, Rockefeller Memorial Chapel 
on May 2, 1969. The Charles Deering McCormick Library of Special Collections; Clergy Consultation 
Service Archive; Box 1, Folder 10.  
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not continue to use one particular physician there because of a “very inquisitive 
switchboard operator” who threatened to discover that they were sending pregnant 
women to him for abortions. They were not sending women to Mexico and Puerto Rico 
for the time being because it was illegal there and “the present ‘Operation Intercept’ for 
drugs is making this type of trip more difficult than usual.”  They were still sending 
women to London for legal abortions, despite the high cost, because they appreciated the 
safety and care given to women by a particular doctor there. Certain cases of women 
could be referred to specific psychiatrists in various locations, especially “people over 
40…children under 18, people with psychiatric history, real emotional trauma over 
continuing pregnancy, actual rape or incest, measles, rubella, cardiac, continual 
bleeding.” They ended the meeting with a discussion of the need for new recruits to the 
Chicago CCS and how they should properly train them about the medical procedure 
through an evening meeting with a gynecologist and how they should discuss with them 
frankly the liabilities of what they were doing.5  
 The people gathered at this Chicago Clergy Consultation Service meeting in 
October 1969 were struggling with the logistics of providing information about abortion 
access to local women because abortion was criminalized in Illinois. They struggled to 
navigate underground networks across the country and even internationally, seeking to 
bypass the sketchy underworld of expensive, often unsafe, and exploitative abortion 
providers and find licensed physicians who were willing to perform the procedure for 
women despite threats of indictment and professional marginalization. The clergy put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Minutes of October 6, 1969 meeting of Chicago Clergy Consultation Service. The Charles Deering 
McCormick Library of Special Collections; Clergy Consultation Service Archive; Box 1, Folder 3.  
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significant time and energy into this organization, despite heavy demands on their time 
by their own local congregations, fears that their local congregations or denominations 
might withdraw support from them over their actions, and concerns about prosecution. 
Why did these Protestant clergy put in this time, energy and personal risk to connect 
women to doctors who could perform abortions? 
 
RELIGIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT SOCIAL JUSTICE AND TACTICS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
 At the same time that abortion was emerging as a social problem, over the 1960s, 
churches and clergy were heavily involved in issues of social justice and tactics of civil 
disobedience. The abortion rights movement came during a wave of many social 
movements of the 1960s and early-1970s, such as the Civil Rights Movement, the 
Antipoverty Movement, the Women’s Liberation Movement, the Environmental 
Movement and the Peace and Anti-Vietnam War Movements. During this period of 
turbulence, there was a “cycle of protest,” with existing social movements leading to a 
wave of new social movements  (Tarrow 1998). Many new social movements arise in the 
wake of larger social movements for a number of reasons, including the creation of 
political opportunities (Tarrow 1998), a general “repertoire of contention” in society 
during those times (Tilly 1995), and existing social movement social networks that can 
bring people into new movements (McAdam 1988).  The social movements of the 1960s 
were “organizationally separate,” but “tended to be mutually interactive, borrowing 
language, ideology, and political strategies from one another” (Davis 1973: 109).  
 The Protestant clergy involved in the abortion rights movement could be 
considered part of a “New Breed” of ministers that arose during the 1960s who were 
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“bent on moving the church toward a more direct role in supporting and inducing social 
change” (Cox 1967: 137) and who played a critical role in lending moral authority to the 
Civil Rights Movement, War on Poverty, and anti-Vietnam War peace movements (Guth 
et al. 1997).  This New Breed of activist clergy emerged for a number of reasons, 
including the restructuring of power among religious groups as Catholics replaced 
Protestants in many cities and the bureaucratization of religious institutions (Cox 1967). 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a sense that clergy’s role in politics was 
progressive and sometimes even radical, documented in now-classic social science studies 
of pastoral politics (i.e. Hadden 1969; Quinley 1974; Stark et al. 1971). 
 The integral role of religion in these social movements of the 1960s was not 
unique. Religion often facilitates collective action, and has been shown to have many 
important effects on social movement activity. Religion can provide key resources to the 
social movement, such as people to participate and clerical leadership (Morris 1984). A 
common religious culture and set of beliefs can help create a common cultural “toolkit” 
to facilitate social movement and political activity (Swidler 1986; Pattillo-McCoy 1998; 
Wood 2002). Religious beliefs can also affect the cohesion or flexibility of social 
movement and political organizational structures, thus affecting their sense of urgency 
(Smith 1991; Young 2002; Nepstad 2004; Young 2006) or their efficacy in enacting 
change (Wood 1999; Stevens 2001; Wood 2002; Wilde 2004; Wilde 2007). 
 During the Civil Rights Movement, religious institutions and clergy played a 
particularly prominent role. Black Protestant churches provided by far the most support 
to the Civil Rights Movement including an institutional center, leadership and charisma 
from the clergy, an organized group of people, a connected social network to transmit 
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information, a common culture and ideological framework, an institutionalized financial 
base, and a meeting place (Morris 1984). White churches were largely absent early in the 
Civil Rights Movement immediately following the 1954 Supreme Court Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, apart from a handful of southern white clergy. However, as the Civil 
Rights Movement turned increasingly towards tactics of sit-ins and freedom rides in the 
1960s, white non-southern clergy became prominent in the movement, especially due to 
widespread attention to their arrests and trials for civil disobedience (Friedland 1998). 
The Civil Rights Movement sought to highlight the contrast between American values 
and racial injustices and “clergy were well suited to serve as moral spokesmen on such 
matters and to participate in the symbolic acts of protest that became a major tactic of the 
movement” (Quinley 1974: 4). 
 This cycle of protest starting with the Civil Rights Movement provided “the most 
significant source of political opportunity for the abortion movement,” especially 
providing a social network of politically engaged clergy, women, and students and tactics 
of direct-action (Evans 1979; Staggenborg 1991: 148). The most important resource for 
creating the abortion rights movement is not simply the people from the Civil Rights 
Movement themselves, but the relationships between them. As the Civil Rights 
Movement was winding down, there was a network of clergy that had planned campaigns 
together, marched together, and gone to jail together. These activists often had quite 
close personal relationships with one another and could encourage, or even pressure, 
others to get involved in this new cause. 
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THE CLERGY CONSULTATION SERVICE ON ABORTION 
 The most important factor that pulled Mainline Protestants into the abortion 
rights movement was the Clergy Consultation Service, which provided a new issue for 
activist clergy to get involved with. The founding of the Clergy Consultation Service on 
Abortion emerged out of the prominent role of religion in the Civil Rights Movement, the 
success of civil disobedience tactics employed by Mainline Protestant clergy, and 
continuing concerns about other forms of social injustice. Some Mainline Protestant 
clergy began considering civil disobedience tactics to address inequality in abortion access 
also, another perceived issue of social injustice. Drawing on archival materials, newspaper 
articles, writings of CCS leaders, and existing historical narratives, I demonstrate that 
existing activist social networks, frames about social injustice, and civil disobedience 
tactics, especially from the Civil Rights Movement, were critical to the successful 
founding and expansion of the Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion.  
 
Origins of the Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion 
 The initial spark of the idea for the Clergy Consultation Service emerged out of a 
meeting of existing activist friends at a September 1966 lunch between a New York 
journalist, Lawrence Lader, and three Mainline Protestant ministers. Lader had 
established himself as one of the most vocal critics of American abortion laws with his 
book Abortion (1966), which focused on abortion as the “dread secret of our society” and 
outlined the underground networks through which hundreds of thousands of American 
women were accessing illegal abortions every year (Lader 1966: 1). In response to his 
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1966 book and his 1965 New York Times Magazine article on “The Scandal of Abortion 
Laws”, he began receiving requests from pregnant women who wanted to know how they 
too could gain access to illegal abortions. Lader “almost accidentally” slipped into his role 
of referring women to contacts in this underground abortion network and into his role as 
campaigner for abortion law reform (qtd in Wolff 1998: 27). He saw this abortion referral 
work as a potential keystone of the abortion rights movement and likened it to the work of 
abolitionists and the Underground Railroad. He believed that abortion referral would 
save women from underground abortions, draw women into the movement, affirm to 
women that laws were wrong, increase public scrutiny on existing laws, and force 
authorities to confront failures of existing laws (Lader 1973).  
 The three Mainline Protestant ministers who had lunch with Lader in September 
1966 when the idea for the CCS was conceived were Episcopalian Rev. John Krumm of 
New York, Episcopalian Rev. Lester Kinsolving of San Francisco, and American Baptist 
Rev. Howard Moody from Greenwich Village’s Judson Memorial Church (Lader 1973: 
44). The three ministers were no strangers to liberal activism. For example, Rev. Howard 
Moody, who would play by far the most prominent role in founding and running the 
Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion, had by that time was integrated into liberal 
social networks and familiar with methods of civil disobedience. Moody had marched 
with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in Alabama and had gotten himself arrested in Brooklyn 
when he, along with hundreds of others, protested segregation in the construction 
industry by lying down in front of cement mixers (Gorney 1998). In 1957, Moody had led 
the Democratic reform movement to challenge the Tammany boss, Carmine De Sapio 
(Lader 1973). Neither Lader nor Moody could remember exactly how they met, but 
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Lader speculated later that it was probably through Democratic reform politics and that 
their “relationship [was] an inevitability, as though two such members of New York City’s 
elite circle of progressives would necessarily be acquainted” (Wolff 1998: 32). When the 
three ministers asked at the lunch how they could help Lader in his work on abortion law 
reform, Lader spontaneously responded that ministers would be the best referrers of 
women to abortion because prosecutors would be hesitant to arrest a minister tending to 
his flock (Lader 1973). 
 
Organizing the Clergy 
 Rev. Howard Moody spent considerable energy over the eight months after the 
meeting with Lader putting together a network of clergy to help refer women to abortion. 
Lader later described Moody as “the ideal candidate for such a project, combining a 
commitment to social responsibility with hardheaded realism” (Lader 1973: 44). Moody 
worked with Rev. Finley Schaef, a civil rights and anti-war activist at Washington Square 
Methodist Church, also in Greenwich Village, to bring together clergy into an abortion 
study group that also discussed other liberal clergy projects, such as civil rights and anti-
war efforts (Wolff 1998). Some of these clergy already had previous experience with 
restrictive abortion laws. For example, Rev. Jesse Lyons of Riverside Church saw his 
niece denied an abortion after contracting German measles; the child she bore was 
institutionalized for life. Rev. Finley Schaef had struggled to help a pregnant fifteen-year-
old girl who had been raped by her father (Lader 1973).  Other clergy in the group, 
however, did not see abortion as a pervasive issue that women in their congregation dealt 
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with and some even worried that they would lose their posts in congregations if they 
persisted in discussing the issue (Lader 1973: 45). Most clergy were not already involved 
in abortion issues, but were activists in other causes. As Howard Moody and Arlene 
Carmen, his assistant at the church and for the Clergy Consultation Service, wrote:  
It was apparent from the start that the clergy who would be most likely to become 
involved in a project of this kind would be the same ones who had been most 
active in the school integration battle in New York, in the civil rights battle both 
there and in the South, as well as in other areas of civil liberties. It was to those 
clergy whose liberal attitudes and commitments had been clearly established that 
we turned for help in developing the original nucleus of the Clergy Consultation 
Service on Abortion. (Carmen and Moody 1973: 21) 
 
 The group kept studying the issue of abortion and over time increasingly agreed 
that it was an issue affecting their congregations, but disagreed over whether they should 
engage in civil disobedience on the issue. The group ultimately decided to let the abortion 
reform Blumenthal bill in the New York State legislature determine the fate of their 
group: if the limited abortion reform bill passed then many of the minister’s consciences 
would be put at ease, but if the bill failed then they would engage in civil disobedience 
(Wolff 1998).  There was tremendous Roman Catholic leadership lobbying against the 
bill, including for the first time in history all eight New York Catholic bishops signing a 
joint statement against abortion reform. Shortly after this joint statement was read in 
most of the state’s seventeen hundred Catholic Churches, the Blumenthal bill failed.  
 When the New York state legislature failed to pass abortion law reform, Rev. 
Howard Moody and twenty-one other clergy, all but two of whom were Protestant, 
organized into a Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion in New York City. Clergy 
came from a variety of denominations, including United Methodist, United Presbyterian, 
United Church of Christ, Episcopalian, Unitarian Universalist and Reform Jewish 
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congregations (Fiske 1967b). On the first day after they went public in an exclusive New 
York Times cover story, the Clergymen’s Consultation Service received more than 35 
telephone calls for advice and the organization emphasized they came from both rich and 
poor women ("35 Call Clergymen for Aid on Abortion" 1967: 95). 
 
Abortion as a Social Justice Issue Demanding Civil Disobedience 
 The Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion framed the issue of abortion as one 
of social injustice. In their initial statement of purpose, the newly-formed group pointed 
out racism and classism in how abortion laws were applied, emphasized that the fetus was 
not a living child and abortion was not murder, provided support to the physicians that 
provided abortions, and argued that “there are higher laws and moral obligations 
transcending legal codes.” The leaders of the CCS believed that “it is our pastoral 
responsibility and religious duty to give aid and assistance to all women with problem 
pregnancies” (qtd in Carmen and Moody 1973: 31). Elected the spokesman of the group, 
Rev. Moody, explained the mission of the group through an exclusive story given to the 
New York Times: “If legal therapeutic abortion is not possible, but an abortion is indicated, 
we will try to get the woman the best possible medical advice to take care of her problem 
pregnancy…In some instances it is possible we would attempt to facilitate her getting an 
abortion in a country where it is legal” (Fiske 1967b: 1). 
 From the beginning, the clergy involved in the network knew that they were 
taking a legal risk. The New York State penal code not only criminalized performing an 
illegal abortion, but also aiding, abetting or assisting in obtaining an illegal abortion. The 
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clergy in the network were required to make three commitments in an early draft of the 
organization’s policy statement: “sharing of information, agreement on a set of standard 
operating procedures, and commitment to support each other in case of legal difficulties” 
due to the “possible illegal action of being accomplices in criminal proceedings” (qtd in 
Wolff 1998: 42). Legal guidance for the CCS came from Cyril Means of New York 
University Law School; Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties 
Union; and Ephraim London, a civil liberties attorney and member of the New York 
Civil Liberties Union Board of Directors, of which Moody was also a member (Wolff 
1998: 44-45). Ephraim London had been a trusted partner of Moody and outlined several 
policies for the CCS for self-protection. First, the clergy were never supposed to admit 
that what they were doing was illegal, rather framing it as their being “bound to a higher 
moral law,” and to be as public about what they were doing as possible so they would not 
look like they were running an underground operation (Carmen and Moody 1973: 26). 
Second, as mentioned above, the clergy were always to make referrals out-of-state 
because crimes involving multiple jurisdictions would be more difficult to prosecute. 
Third, they were never to accept money for their services. 
 The clergy decided they would focus primarily on helping women gain access to 
abortions rather than on changing the laws, despite advice to the contrary. For example, 
Dr. Robert Hall from Columbia Presbyterian Hospital counseled the forming Clergy 
Consultation Service that they should do nothing illegal, but instead should bring 
pressure upon hospitals to do more legal abortions by sending pregnant women for 
hospital abortions. The hope in this plan was that it would challenge anti-abortion biases 
among physicians by demonstrating to them the incredible variety and scale of the need. 
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The group ultimately decided that this could delay women from getting a timely and safe 
abortion, could force them to have unwanted children, and was using women for their 
own political aims (Carmen and Moody 1973: 24). 
 Facilitating women’s access to abortion was such a core mission of the group that 
they wanted their name to reflect this central concern rather than bowing to polite 
convention. Many clergy wanted to name the service “Clergy Consultation Service on 
Problem Pregnancy,” as “abortion” in 1967 was “a taboo word rarely used except in 
whispered conversations” (Carmen and Moody 1973: 27). They thought the euphemism 
would soften their appearance and gain more public support. However, the group 
decided they “didn’t want to chicken out on it” and, after rigorous debate, decided they 
would embrace the term “abortion” (Lader 1973: 45). They called themselves the “Clergy 
Consultation Service on Abortion” so that it was clear to the women that they wanted to 
assist that they were there to help them get an abortion not persuade them to keep or give 
up for adoption their “problem pregnancy.” 
 The New York City Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion focused their 
energy on efficiently connecting women to licensed doctors who could provide safe 
abortions and who would not exploit the women for money or sex, as was often the case 
for women who navigated the murky underworld networks of illegal abortions (Lader 
1966).  Women would call in to the listed number for the CCS and reach an answering 
machine that gave contact information for the clergy who were on call that week. On call 
clergy rotated generally one week on and then four off and, when they were on call, they 
often worked six or seven hours a day counseling women. The clergy would meet with the 
women in their office for generally about one hour, framing the meeting as confidential 
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pastoral counseling. The clergy would refer the pregnant women to licensed physicians 
practicing outside of New York State. They referred women around the country, 
especially to Pittsburgh, Washington DC, Chicago, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico, and 
internationally, especially Mexico, Japan and England. No money was given to the clergy 
for the meeting and women were solely responsible for paying for the abortion 
themselves. However, the price was negotiated between the CCS and the referred doctor 
and there was generally a limited number of discounted rate abortions available at clerical 
discretion for particularly poor women. The clergy realized over time that they could 
collectively bargain lower prices for the women, given the load of patients they were 
referring to particular doctors. To find doctors willing to provide safe abortions, Arlene 
Carmen, Reverend Moody’s assistant, would pretend to be a pregnant woman, contact 
doctors, and investigate their credentials, care, cleanliness, and prices. She had a 
reputation for ruthlessness in these visits and once rejected five doctors in Philadelphia in 
one week (Carmen and Moody 1973; Lader 1973). 
  
Mobilization Spread Across the Country 
Clergymen around the country were so impressed by the model of New York 
City’s Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion that similar groups in other states 
immediately began organizing ("More Clerics Plan Advice on Abortion" 1967). The 
clergy networks spread throughout the country, encompassing primarily Mainline 
Protestant clergy, but some Unitarian Universalists, Reform Jewish rabbis, and other 
denominations. These networks of clergy spread through existing activist social networks, 
especially those related to the Civil Rights movement, and the mobilization was facilitated 
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by existing concern about social justice and respect for civil disobedience as a critical 
tactic to address perceived injustices.  
The best estimates suggest that these Clergy Consultation Services spread to 
include 1,400-2,000 clergy and helped over 100,000 women find doctors who could 
provide abortions (Wolff 1998: 110; Davis 2006). They referred a surprisingly large and 
diverse group of pregnant women over their tenure. The New York City Clergy 
Consultation Service referred eight hundred women in 1967, three thousand women in 
1968, and ten thousand women in 1969 (Davis 2006: 131). Rev. E. Spencer Parson, 
chairman of the Chicago Clergy Consultation Service, reported that their network saw 
10,000 women in Chicago from 1969 to 1973.6 A 1970 sample of 6,455 of the women 
seen by the New York City Clergy Consultation Service shows that 66% of them were 
single, 84% were white, 50% were over the age of 25 and 13% were under the age of 18. 
Only 4% were pregnant for more than 3 months. While the clergy were predominantly 
Mainline Protestant, the women were quite diverse in their religious affiliations: 37% 
reported being Protestant, 36% were Catholic, and 25% were Jewish. CCS leaders 
particularly highlighted the large number of Catholic women being referred to abortions 
within their internal archival materials to further challenge Catholic leadership’s 
opposition to abortion access. These numbers are remarkably similar to a 1970 survey of 
women referred by the Chicago CCS, although there were more Protestants relative to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Interview of E. Spencer Parsons by Paula Kamen on October 9, 1992. Paula Kamen Collection. Box 1, 
Folder 7. The Charles Deering McCormick Library of Special Collections. 
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Jewish women and a larger proportion (19%) were more than 3 months pregnant when 
seeking the abortion.7  
 
Forming New Clergy Consultation Services 
A minority of local Clergy Consultation Services started up in response to 
women’s demands. For example, in 1968 a small group of women approached several 
clergymen asking them to open a Philadelphia CCS. Two of the women spoke to Howard 
Moody and Arlene Carmen of the New York CCS and in November 1968 the group of 
women elected an American Baptist, Rev. Allen Hinand, to organize the first 
Philadelphia-area CCS. Like the New York CCS, it had an answering machine that 
directed women to clergy counselors. Later, Rev. Hinand and Rev. Moody encouraged 
Rev. Paul Gehris to start a Harrisburg CCS, as all three were American Baptist 
Convention ministers and involved in the civil rights movement (Carmen and Moody 
1973; Wolff 1998).  Many of the ministers that started these regional Clergy Consultation 
Services were college chaplains who were already helping students find abortion, such as 
Rev. J. Claude Evans of Southern Methodist University, who established a CCS in 
Dallas. 
While some Clergy Consultation Services were sparked by women’s demands, 
most appeared to have started due to Howard Moody actively encouraging ministers 
within his social network to start their own. Later interviews of key leaders of the Clergy 
Consultation Service on Abortion across the country demonstrate that those involved in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Charles Deering McCormick Library of Special Collections; Clergy Consultation Service; Box 1, Folder 2.  
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the early stages of the CCS had been involved in the civil rights movement and most 
believed that this is where they first met Moody (Wolff 1998: 118-119). As Gorney 
described, “Howard Moody was traveling to places like Cleveland and Chicago, working 
social webs laid out by the civil rights movement and Vietnam War protest, calling 
meetings together in church halls or ministers’ offices or bare-floored college rooms with 
folding chairs and Stop the Draft posters on the walls” (Gorney 1998: 34). Eleanor Yeo, a 
United Church of Christ minister at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee campus 
talked about what Moody told them:  
Howard started telling us about the ravages of illegal abortion, and what was 
happening to women, and what the death rate was like…Maybe it was lucky it 
was during the Vietnam War, because I think a lot of people at that point were 
questioning authority in ways they never had before. People who ordinarily would 
not think of doing anything illegal were all of a sudden thinking of things they had 
to do. (qtd in Gorney 1998: 34-35) 
 
Some of these ministers were already supporting Planned Parenthood, while some were 
actively involved in the civil rights movements and wanted to fight sexism in addition to 
racism (Davis 2006). 
Howard Moody was not above pressuring his fellow activist clergy friends into 
getting involved in the abortion rights issue. For example, Rev. E. Spencer Parsons, who 
became the chairperson of the Chicago CCS, was pushed hard by Rev. Moody to create 
his own service in early 1968, but Parsons demurred. As a University of Chicago 
chaplain, Rev. Parsons was contacted by many women for abortion access and referred 
them to the New York City CCS. Rev. Moody and Rev. Parsons were already friends. 
Both were ministers in the American Baptist Convention; both were involved in the civil 
rights movement together; both were opposed to the Vietnam War; and both had worked 
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together on church policy and for changes in the national drug policy (Staggenborg 1991; 
Kaplan 1995). Together they also drafted a resolution, which passed at the American 
Baptist Convention Annual Meeting in June 1968, calling on ministers to counsel and 
assist women with family planning and abortion (American Baptist Convention 1968; 
Kaplan 1995). While in New York for an American Baptist Convention executive 
committee meeting, Moody told Parsons that they could not handle the added load of 
Parsons’ Chicago referrals and once again urged Parsons to start a Clergy Consultation 
Service in Chicago. Parsons finally organized one in December 1968 and went public in 
December 1969. Later, in 1970, Parsons founded the Illinois Clergy Consultation 
Service, which reached out to women across the state. 
 
Spread of Clergy Consultation Services Across Country  
 Clergy Consultation Services spread rapidly across the country from the time the 
first service started in May of 1967 until the services disbanded in January 1973 after the 
U.S. Supreme Court decriminalized abortion across the country in its Roe v. Wade 
decision. Over these years, most of the American population lived in a state with at least 
one local clergy consultation service network and others that could afford to could travel 
to a more distant network. By 1973 only ten states never created their own clergy 
consultation service.8 Lists of local clergy consultation services distributed by the National 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Based on archived lists of local clergy consultation services distributed by the National Clergy 
Consultation Service found in archives, the only states to never have their own services were Alaska, 
Arkansas, Delaware, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. Some of these states were served by other state’s services, such as Delaware, which had access to 
large networks of clergy in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. It is also possible that one of these states had a 
local service that was small or disconnected from the national network. 
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Clergy Consultation Service reveal that these services spread most quickly between 1970 
and 1971 (See Figure 1). This figure underestimates the size of the network because as 
new states decriminalized abortion, the clergy networks there would technically disband 
although many still existed in a different form to help women access abortion. For 
example, the first Service in New York City, which formed in 1967, technically no longer 
existed in 1970 after the state passed abortion repeal, although it still helped other 
services and continued work helping women gain access to newly-legal abortions. 
Figure 1: Expansion of Clergy Consultation Services Across the United States, May 1968-
January 19739 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 List of Services found in Clergy Consultation Services Collection, Box 1, in the Charles Deering 
McCormick Library of Special Collections and the Chicago Clergy Consultation Service Records, Box 1 
and 2, in the University of Illinois at Chicago Special Collections. Data was supplemented by Carmen and 
Moody 1973. 
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Composition of National Clergy Consultation Service Chairmen 
 The local Clergy Consultation Services across the country were generally 
organized by Mainline Protestants, but were quite diverse in their geography and their 
denominations. An April 1971 snapshot of the Clergy Consultation Service’s spread 
across the country is shown in Table 3. By this time, twenty-five states had Services with 
numbers that women could call for help in seeking an abortion, with multiple cities 
represented in some states, such as Illinois and Ohio. Of the 34 chairs of local Services, 
two were women (and not clergy) and one clergymen’s denomination was unidentifiable, 
due to a common name. Of the 31 clergymen that were identified, the denominations 
represented included: American Baptist Convention (7), United Church of Christ (6), 
United Methodist Church (6), Episcopal Church (5), Unitarian Universalist (3), United 
Presbyterian Church (2), Reform Judaism (1), and Presbyterian Church in the United 
States [southern] (1). Clergy Consultation Services were predominantly Mainline 
Protestant networks, with 87% of the clergy leading local services in April 1971 coming 
from Mainline Protestant denominations.  
Table 3: National Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion, Chairmen of Local Services 
in April 1971⁠10  
Clergy Location Denomination 
Rev. George Telford Alabama (Auburn) Presbyterian Church in the 
United States 
Rev. Paul Gaston Arizona (Tempe) United Church of Christ 
Rev. J. Hugh Anwyl California (Los Angeles) United Church of Christ 
Rev. Jerry Kolb Colorado (Denver) Episcopal Church 
Rev. C. Arthur Bradley Connecticut (New Haven) United Church of Christ 
Rev. Chris Martin Florida (Mandarin) --- 
Rev. Lionel Miles Illinois (Champaign) United Church of Christ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Clergy Consultation Services. Box 1, Folder 2. The Charles Deering McCormick Library of Special 
Collections. 
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Clergy Location Denomination 
Rev. E. Spencer Parsons Illinois (Chicago) American Baptist Convention 
Rev. Samuel Edwards Illinois (Peoria) --- 
Rev. Neil Sowards Indiana (Fort Wayne) American Baptist Convention 
Rev. Robert Griffin Iowa (Des Moines) United Methodist Church 
Rev. Robert Dodwell Louisiana (New Orleans) Episcopal Church 
Rev. Garvey MacLean Maine (Lewiston) United Church of Christ 
Rev. William Coleman Massachusetts (Wellesley) United Methodist Church 
Rev. Alden Hathaway Michigan (Bloomfield Hills) Episcopal Church 
Rev. Clinton Galloway Michigan (Grand Rapids) United Methodist Church 
Rev. Robert Leas Michigan (Lansing) United Presbyterian Church 
Rev. William Kirby Missouri (Columbia) United Methodist Church 
Ms. Sharon Shaw Nebraska (Omaha) --- 
Rev. Robert Richards Nevada (Henderson) United Church of Christ 
Rev. Orrin T. Hardgrove New Jersey (Rahway) American Baptist Convention 
Rev. Howard Moody New York (New York) American Baptist Convention 
Rev. James Riddle North Carolina (Chapel Hill) Unitarian Universalist 
Rev. Dave Sammons Ohio (Cincinnati) Unitarian Universalist 
Rabbi Frank Stern Ohio (Cleveland) Reform Judaism 
Rev. George Whitney Ohio (Columbus) Unitarian Universalist 
Ms. Jan Griesinger Ohio (Dayton) --- 
Rev. Allen Hinand Pennsylvania (Wayne) American Baptist Convention 
Rev. H. Alan Elmore South Carolina (Greenville) United Presbyterian Church 
Rev. J. Paschall Davis Tennessee (Nashville) Episcopal Church 
Rev. Bob Breihan Texas (Austin) United Methodist Church 
Rev. J. Claude Evans Texas (Dallas) United Methodist Church 
Rev. Lowell Fewster Wisconsin (Madison) American Baptist Convention 
Rev. James Dick Wisconsin (Waukesha)  American Baptist Convention 
  
These chairmen were also involved in activism before getting involved in the 
Clergy Consultation Services, some in the birth control movement and others involved in 
the Civil Rights movement. Rev. J. Hugh Anwyl, the United Church of Christ chairman 
of the Los Angeles CCS, was already involved in the birth control movement and was the 
Los Angeles Planned Parenthood director from 1971-1988 ("L.A. Planned Parenthood 
Director" 1988). United Methodist Rev. J. Claude Evans, the chairman of the Dallas 
CCS, had already gotten himself banned from preaching by a church board vote of 87 to 
3 in Columbia, South Carolina, after preaching a sermon on racial justice in 1942 and he 
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had worked with youth in the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s (Houck and 
Dixon 2006: 515). Presbyterian Rev. George Telford, Chairman of the Auburn, 
Alabama, CCS, had created controversy in the Deep South by preaching about racial 
injustice since 1959 and he helped organize people to attend the 1965 Christian Action 
Conference where Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others were speaking (Telford 2003). 
Rev. Bob Breihan of Austin’s CCS had been involved in the Texas Methodist Student 
Movement and the Austin desegregation movement of the 1950s and was involved in the 
anti-Vietnam War protests (Rag Radio 2013). Rev. E. Spencer Parsons, the Baptist 
chairman of the Chicago CCS, had been involved in the birth control movement in 
Massachusetts,11 and had been involved in the Civil Rights and Vietnam War movements 
with other clergy including Rev. Moody (Kaplan 1995). The clergy who headed local 
Services were already deeply embedded in activist social networks, especially in the Civil 
Rights movement.  
 
CYCLE OF PROTEST, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 The role of the Civil Rights Movement in the Abortion Rights Movement 
demonstrates the importance of existing social movements in the creation of a new social 
movement both in terms of cultural frames and in terms of networks of social movement 
actors. Existing social movements can provide frames about social problems and existing 
tactics to address those social problems. In this case, existing frames about the central 
problem of social injustice and existing respect and legitimacy for high-risk tactics of civil 
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disobedience from the Civil Rights Movement were applied to the Abortion Rights 
Movement. Existing social movements also provide participants, relationships, and 
infrastructure to new social movements. In this case, personal relationships among 
activists in the Civil Rights Movement helped mobilize new people on the abortion issue.  
 Social interaction and network relations have been found to affect both political 
participation (Kenny 1992; McClurg 2003) and social movement participation (Snow et 
al. 1980; McAdam 1986; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; McAdam 1988; Hirsch 1990; 
Chong 1991; Gould 1991). Many characteristics of social networks have been found to 
affect social movement mobilization and effectiveness, such as density and centralization 
of the network (Oliver et al. 1985; Oliver and Marwell 1988) and the position of 
individuals within networks (Gould 1993; Kim and Bearman 1997). 
 In particular, social networks can help bring new people into a social movement. 
Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson’s (1980) influential article led the way in focusing on 
network-based structure in social movement mobilization. They showed how social 
connections between members of Nichiren Shoshu of America were key in bringing new 
members into the organization (Snow et al. 1980). Others have shown that decisions to 
engage in collective action are made interdependently with others’ decisions to act 
(Marwell et al. 1988; Opp 1989; Gamson 1990; Macy 1991a; Macy 1991b). In particular, 
scholars have demonstrated that the more participants, the more likely a new individual 
will decide it is in their best interest to participate also (Granovetter 1978; Marwell and 
Oliver 1993; Schelling 2006). For example, McAdam (1988) found that in the 1964 
Mississippi Freedom Summer Project, during which predominately northern and white 
volunteers traveled to Mississippi to register African-Americans to vote, groups of friends 
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often decided to participate after a discussion of “I’ll go if you go.” Potential participants 
in the Freedom Summer were influenced by a feeling that participation would be effective 
if others were participating and that it would be uncomfortable to withdraw while one’s 
friends were committed (McAdam 1988). Similarly, participants in the Paris Commune of 
1871 were pressured to join by neighbors (Gould 1991). 
 Social networks do not just affect one’s interest in participation (Gould 1993), but 
also one’s weighing of the costs and benefits of the collective action (McClurg 2003). The 
basic premise of Olson’s classic discussion of the free-rider problem assumes that rational 
actors’ contribution to the public good is not independent from the actions of other actors 
(Olson 1965). Gould (1993) emphasizes the role of two concerns in mediating collective 
action contributions: norms of fairness that encourage individuals to match others 
contributions and a desire to avoid making wasted contributions, in mediating collective 
action contributions (Gould 1993). Hirsch found evidence of these two concerns among 
participants in an anti-apartheid divestiture movement, who saw their own participation 
as a response to the perceived altruistic participation of others (Hirsch 1990). Relations 
with other activists have been shown to be particularly important for keeping people in 
movements that involve high-risk activism (McAdam 1986), which abortion referral 
mobilization was. Once involved in a social movement, participants are also likely to form 
new social relations while participating in collective protest. As Gould argues, 
“Mobilization does not just depend on social ties; it also creates them” (Gould 1991: 719). 
In this case, existing social movements, particularly the Civil Rights Movement, created 
ties among clergy that were then used to bring participants into the Clergy Consultation 
Service on Abortion around the country.  
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CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
What is remarkable in looking closely at the Clergy Consultation Services is just 
how focused these clergy were on providing abortion access to women. They put intense 
time, energy, and personal risk into building institutional infrastructure to connect 
women to abortion providers. The participants saw engaging in civil disobedience to help 
women gain access to abortion as a very legitimate and rational thing for clergy to do. In 
their meeting minutes and records, they are never debating whether or not they should 
continue their work, considering their motivations, or doubting the morality of their 
tactics, even when dealing with potential prosecution by local authorities. Instead, they 
are focused quite narrowly on how they can continue doing what they are doing and how 
to do it more effectively. They consider how they can reach out to new doctors in new 
states and countries to perform abortion, how to negotiate for lower prices for the 
abortions, how to better reach out to women with unwanted pregnancies, and how to 
connect with other organizations to support their work. 
 The ministers in these Clergy Consultation Services were putting themselves on 
the line, using civil disobedience to address the perceived inequalities and injustices in 
abortion laws. As discussed earlier, they knew that what they were doing was technically 
illegal, but had been advised to always speak openly about what they were doing and 
never to appear to be working in the shadows. However, in actuality they were often 
working in the shadows. For example, after Rev. Moody found out that his church’s 
phone line had been tapped, the New York City CCS made all important calls from a 
pay phone a few blocks away and used cryptic code language on the church’s own line 
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(Carmen and Moody 1973: 35). In another example, fifty clergy in the California CCS 
from around the state passed around a memo from an old manual typewriter dated 
August 16, 1968, which provided directions for women to get illegal abortions in Mexico. 
The memo read:  
Dr. Madrid is on again. He and his assistants moved all equipment from Juarez 
to Nogales, Sonora, since we last communicated with you. The new arrangement 
is as follows: Fly to Tucson, Ariz. Take bus to Nogales, Ariz., a 1 hr. 10 min. 
Ride. From the U.S. Side of Nogales call 21 70 5 on the Mexican side. Say ‘this 
is Mary’ and receive the reply ‘this is Pete,’ as before. An English-speaking man 
will be on duty from 9AM to 7PM daily. He will instruct the caller as to meeting 
place the driver will identify himself with the green card with our stamp on it, as 
usual. New prices: $250 to 8 wks., $350 8-13 wks. (qtd in Gorney 1998: 31-32) 
 
Given that clergy passed out information about code-phrases women should use to obtain 
illegal Mexican abortions, it’s hard to argue that they were actually working outside of the 
shadows. 
Some clergy of the CCS indeed dealt with legal repercussions in helping women 
obtain illegal abortions. For example, United Presbyterian Rev. Robert Hare in 
Cleveland and Reform Jewish Rabbi Max Ticktin in Chicago both were arrested and 
charged by prosecutors for referring women to illegal abortions over state lines. American 
Baptist Rev. E. Spencer Parsons found himself called in front of two grand juries in 
Illinois by then-Congressman Henry Hyde. In front of the grand jury, Rev. Parsons 
responded to all questions by saying “I’m sorry, I can’t give you that information because 
it would violate the confidential character of my pastoral ministry.”12  Although he knew 
the phrase lacked legal standing, he thought it would be enough to make politicians wary 
to challenge churches. The resulting news coverage had the unexpected result of simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Interview of E. Spencer Parsons by Paula Kamen on October 9, 1992. Paula Kamen Collection. Box 1, 
Folder 7. The Charles Deering McCormick Library of Special Collections. 
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bolstering public opinion in favor of what the clergy were doing and no clergy were 
subsequently prosecuted. When Rabbi Max Ticktin of the Chicago Clergy Consultation 
Service on Problem Pregnancies was charged with conspiracy to commit abortion, 
Christian Century reported positively on these clergy counseling groups, saying that “the 
practical involvement of Christian and Jewish clergy in counseling…has become the 
critical frontier for the religious conscience on these issues” ("Abortion Counseling in 
Legal Trouble" 1970: 68). Interestingly, some of the Clergy Consultation Service’s 
interaction with the law was positive. For example, they were heartily thanked by the 
husband of a woman who received an abortion through the service and were surprised to 
find out afterward that he was a captain in the New York City Police Department 
(Carmen and Moody 1973: 36). 
The clergy were constantly engaged in discussions about how to more efficiently 
allow women to gain access to abortions. As the New York City Clergy Consultation 
Service grew, they struggled to find enough doctors to handle the caseload and so they 
increasingly began thinking of ways to open their own clinic. In 1968, the New York City 
CCS began “fantasiz[ing] about setting up an ‘abortion ship’ just outside the three-mile 
limit under a foreign (Japanese) flag” and “envision[ed] a steady stream of women 
descending on New York’s Hudson River with oars slung over their shoulders, ready to 
row out to the ship” (Carmen and Moody 1973: 67). They got someone to investigate the 
maritime law implications of such action, which resulted in concerns that the U.S. 
Government might pressure Japan to stop allowing them to fly the flag. They began to 
raise funds for the ship, and finally dropped the idea when medical advisors became 
concerned about the safety of the women.  
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The New York City Clergy Consultation Service eventually succeeded in their 
quest to create their own abortion clinic. By the end of 1969, they started planning a 
“Reproductive Crisis Facility,” which would be a freestanding non-profit clinic where 
women could obtain legal abortions based on two physicians’ certifying they were 
suicidal, which they were simply going to say was the case for all women. By July 1970, 
after abortion laws were repealed by the New York state legislature, they no longer 
needed this deception, dropped the plans, and instead founded a “Women’s Services” 
clinic that provided legal and safe abortions to women. While Dr. Hale Harvey, an 
abortion provider, owned the clinic, the Clergy Consultation Service dictated its policies 
and provided almost all the referrals (Carmen and Moody 1973). The clinic was open 
sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, and performed 26,000 abortions in its first 
thirteen months of operation (Davis 2006: 135). In 1972, the CCS began helping to 
spread this model of a freestanding abortion clinic to other parts of the country (Carmen 
and Moody 1973).  
The participants of the Clergy Consultation Service often referred to a higher 
calling when explaining why it was important for them to invest significant effort and 
engage in civil disobedience on this issue. They also believed their position of authority 
made their effort particularly effective. As E. Spencer Parsons, the chairperson of the 
Chicago CCS, said in a later interview: 
There was that tradition that what you said to a clergyperson, short of a 
confession of murder, was confidential and we know that we had that protection 
and therefore felt we had some obligations…I knew the Illinois law was being 
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broken…I never said that I was doing something illegal. I said that I was doing 
something necessary.13 
 
Participants in the Clergy Consultation Service were less concerned about the civil 
disobedience in part because they had gotten used to the idea in the Civil Rights 
Movement. As United Presbyterian Rev. Unsworth explained about the legal concern in 
a later interview, “we had in the civil rights movement…a lot of experience stepping 
across that kind of [legal] threshold, so this didn’t seem like a big deal [in the CCS]. Sure 
it was illegal and all that, but we’d done that. We knew how that felt and how to deal with 
that” (qtd in Wolff 1998: 120). Clergy civil disobedience was also clearly condoned by 
Protestant institutions that wanted to support clergy efforts in the Civil Rights Movement 
and Vietnam War Protests. For example, the National Council of Churches, an 
ecumenical body of Protestant denominations, passed a 1968 policy statement that 
encouraged civil disobedience in conditions of injustice. The United Presbyterian Church 
in the United States supported civil disobedience, such as in the Vietnam War protests, 
explaining that “going to jail may be a rather harsh penalty for the expression of one’s 
conscience, yet at the present time it is the only alternative for one who feels that a 
particular war is not in accord with the dictates of his conscience” (United Presbyterian 
Church in the United States of America 1966: 395). Understandings of the necessity and 
legitimacy of civil disobedience from existing movements made the clergy more 
comfortable and desensitized to the risk of the abortion referral movement. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interview of E. Spencer Parsons by Paula Kamen on October 9, 1992. Paula Kamen Collection. Box 1, 
Folder 7. The Charles Deering McCormick Library of Special Collections. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The Clergy Consultation Service on Abortion was the most significant factor in 
getting Protestants mobilized in action, not just debate, on abortion rights, and in 
transforming the discourse around abortion and religion. First, the Clergy Consultation 
Service mobilized Mainline Protestant activist social networks related to the Civil Rights 
Movement, the Vietnam War protests, and other liberal politics onto the issue of abortion 
also. Second, the Clergy Consultation Service used the prestige and respectability 
associated with clergy to make abortion a respectable issue to talk about and take action 
on. For the wider American society, the Clergy Consultation Service took abortion out of 
the shadows, made it a respectable issue to discuss, and framed it as an important issue of 
social injustice to mobilize on. Finally, the Clergy Consultation Service provided a 
counter-balance to the Roman Catholic Church by articulating a religious position in 
favor of decriminalizing abortion. It successfully framed abortion rights as a religious issue 
and not just for the anti-abortion side. The ecumenical nature of the Clergy Consultation 
Service, bringing together Mainline Protestants from many denominations, Reform Jews, 
and Unitarian Universalists, further increased the strength of its religious advocacy for 
abortion law change. This set up a situation for religious institutions in which it was 
respectable for Protestant denominations to speak about abortion on the pro-abortion-
rights side. As will be discussed in the following chapter, in the late-1960s and early-1970s 
all the prominent Protestant denominations released official pronouncements in favor of 
relaxing abortion laws.  
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 This chapter has sought to explain why abortion access came to be seen as such 
an important issue among Protestants that many put in significant time, energy, and 
personal risk to the cause. These Protestants saw abortion as another issue of social 
injustice, like civil rights, for which protest by civil disobedience was justified and 
necessary.  While social movement scholars have long argued that there are “cycles of 
protest,” where a social movement is likely to breed new social movements, the formation 
of the abortion rights movement demonstrates that this is not just about a spirit of 
activism, although that’s certainly important, but also about pre-existing social activist 
networks, cultural frames, and tactics that can be mobilized onto a new social issue.  
 Protestant mobilization in the early abortion movement sheds light on the central 
role of existing social movements in the creation of new social movements. First, existing 
social movements can provide existing frames about social problems and tactics to 
address those social problems. In this case, existing frames from the Civil Rights 
movement about the important problem of social injustice and the legitimacy of high-risk 
tactics of civil disobedience to address injustice were applied to the abortion rights 
movement. Second, existing social movements create relationships that can draw in new 
participants to new movements. It is not just that an existing social movement provides 
potential participants, but that it creates close personal relationships that can encourage, 
or even pressure, people into action on a new issue. In this case, existing personal 
relationships among activists in the Civil Rights Movement helped push new people into 
action on the abortion issue.  
 This chapter also brings attention to the important role of religion in social 
movements and politics, especially in progressive politics in the mid-century United States 
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(Morris 1984; Smith 1991; Chaves 1997; Young 2002; Nepstad 2004; Davis 2006; Young 
2006). After the growth of the Religious Right in the 1980s, much scholarship and 
popular press attention has been paid to the effect of Protestants, and religious groups 
more generally in conservative and Republican politics.  We commonly think of the role 
of religion in abortion politics to be conservative, but Protestants were strongly engaged 
in abortion rights activism since before Roe v. Wade. These Protestants provided significant 
legitimacy to social activism on this controversial social problem. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT: SHIFTS IN OFFICIAL MAINLINE 
PROTESTANT STANCES ON ABORTION 
INTRODUCTION 
 How did the debate around abortion transform among Mainline Protestant 
institutions over time? I look at Mainline Protestant denominations’ official stances on 
abortion over time as well as their discussion of the issue in their institutional documents 
and denominational periodicals and find significant shifting on the issue of abortion over 
time among these institutions. However, there is also surprising homogeneity in timing 
and scope of statements among all Mainline protestant institutions. Before the early-
1960s, none of the most prominent Protestant institutions in the United States supported 
abortion access. From 1966-1972, all of the most prominent Protestant institutions 
released official statements in favor of decriminalizing abortion.  Until the 1980s, there 
was much consensus among Mainline Protestant institutions about the “legitimate” stance 
on abortion, although the actual stance shifted. However, in the late-1980s, that 
consensus fell away and there has been a divergence in institutions’ official abortion 
stances. From 1987-1992, all Mainline Protestant institutions reexamined their abortion 
stances and shifted to varying degrees, creating a new divide between those that 
continued to explicitly advocate for choice and those that backed away from that stance. 
 I find that much of the debate around abortion among Mainline Protestant 
institutions is not generally characterized by polarization on two sides, as many scholars 
and laypeople might assume (i.e. Hunter 1991; Luker 1984; Steinfels 2008; Douthat 
2012; Edsall 2014), but rather is composed of much gray area, consensus, and change 
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over time. However, agreement about the “legitimate” stance on abortion has declined 
among Mainline Protestant denominations and stances have grown increasingly 
contested. Mainline Protestant denominations’ official stances on abortion have become 
less homogenous with one another and abortion stances have grown increasingly 
contentious within denominations since the 1980s. This chapter will be descriptive, 
particularly looking at the debate around abortion through the 1960s and 1970s, and will 
demonstrate much consensus rather than conflict on abortion. Other scholars have found 
polarization on abortion and argued that a worldview centered around God leads to pro-
life politics (Luker 1984; Hunter 1991). In contrast, I find much consensus on abortion 
and that religious institutions that engaged in pro-choice politics. However this agreement 
that Mainline Protestant denominations should engage in pro-choice politics greatly 
declined over the 1980s and consensus gave way to conflict. This conflict and the 
diverging shifts among Mainline Protestant official stances will be explained further in 
Chapter 3. This chapter seeks to challenge assumptions about the basic trends on the 
relationship between religion, politics, and abortion beliefs by looking at large, 
mainstream Protestant institutions instead of activists as other scholars have done (Luker 
1984; Ginsburg 1989; Staggenborg 1991; Maxwell 2002; Rohlinger 2006).  
 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT PROTESTANT ABORTION STANCES 
 Existing literature generally portrays abortion stances and beliefs as the 
quintessential example of culture war politics with two radically differing and 
irreconcilable worldviews clashing together.  Hunter (1991) argues, and many prominent 
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scholars and pundits have concurred, that American religion and politics more generally 
is divided between religious conservatives and liberals into a “culture war” based on 
different worldviews and sources of moral authority. However, studies of the culture war 
hypothesis have found that Americans are no more polarized than previously and that the 
culture war does not exist in the beliefs between individuals, but rather in the public 
rhetoric between political elites and institutions (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Williams 1997; 
Layman 1999; Baker 2005; Fiorina et al. 2011). In general, scholars have accepted that 
culture war politics are an effective myth framing how Americans understand what unites 
and divides them. This myth defines religious and political identity, and is a “campaign to 
construct new forms of political identity and define the terms of political engagement” 
(DiMaggio 2003: 94). While many have challenged the idea that most of America is 
embroiled in a culture war, the culture war idea persists with abortion, in particular, seen 
as uniquely polarizing and emerging out of radically different worldviews. 
 Most of the existing literature on abortion looks at activists on the extremes, 
leading one to assume that there is a great division on the issue of abortion and that the 
debate is composed primarily of true believers (Luker 1984; Ginsburg 1989; Staggenborg 
1991; Maxwell 2002; Davis 2006; Rohlinger 2006). Because most research looking at 
abortion politics looks at activists at the edges rather than mainstream institutions, there is 
a poor sense of how institutions deal with this debate over time. There is no complete 
picture of mainstream Protestant institutions’ views of abortion over time that depicts 
both anti-abortion and pro-choice views. Research that looks at pro-choice activism over 
time, like Davis (2006), focuses just on pro-choice activism by religious organizations and 
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individuals. Research that looks at pro-life activism over time, like Maxwell (2002), 
focuses primarily on pro-life activism by religious organizations and individuals. Research 
that looks at both pro-life and pro-choice activists, like Luker (1984), hasn't focused 
significantly on religious institutions. By focusing on activism and only mentioning 
religious organizations in passing, this research misses the story of how the same 
institutions alternately engage sometimes in pro-life and sometimes in pro-choice 
activism. 
 The primary study that sociologists cite about abortion beliefs in the United States 
is Luker (1984) and scholars typically use her analysis of abortion politics in America to 
demonstrate that the abortion debate is necessarily controversial, polarized, and an 
example of culture war politics emerging out of different sources of moral authority as 
Hunter (1991) had described (i.e. Fischer and Mattson 2009; Putnam and Campbell 
2010). Luker argues that abortion views come out of  
two very different orientations to the world and that these orientations in turn 
revolve around two very different moral centers. The pro-life world view, is at the 
core one that centers around God…the pro-choice world view is not centered 
around a Divine Being, but rather around a belief in the highest abilities of human 
beings. For them, reason—the human capacity to use intelligence, rather than 
faith, to understand and alter the environment—is at the core of their world. 
(Luker 1984:  186, 188) 
If views on abortion are polarized and come neatly out of larger worldviews, it seems a 
safe assumption that large religious institutions, which have extensively articulated 
worldviews, will also have more clarity and stasis in their abortion stances. If the pro-life 
worldview is centered around God and the pro-choice worldview is centered around 
secular humanism, those presumptions lead to an expectation that a religious 
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organization would be pro-life. However, as this chapter will show, there was much 
consensus for a long time among the largest and most mainstream Protestant institutions 
in the United States that the proper religious response to abortion was a pro-choice view.  
Among these institutions the debate was not polarized in black and white, but full of 
shades of gray, ambiguity, and significant change. Although it might be surprising given 
the nature of our current abortion debates, much of the debate around abortion within 
these large, moderate and mainstream institutions is characterized by consensus, although 
conflict has arisen since the 1980s. 
 
METHODS 
 How did Mainline Protestant institutions’ official stances on abortion shift over 
time? As described in the introduction, I employ a historical-comparative approach by 
looking at official stances on abortion, from 1960 to today, of a sample of the six largest 
and most prominent Mainline Protestant denominations and their predecessor 
denominations: American Baptist Churches in the USA, Episcopal Church, Evangelical 
Lutheran Churches in America, Presbyterian Church (USA), United Church of Christ, 
and United Methodist Church. In sum, my sample includes eight Mainline Protestant 
denominations in 1960 that correspond to six groups today.  
 I read and coded all official statements related to abortion by all the Mainline 
Protestant institutions in my sample. They were categorized according to a 5-point scale 
(see Table 4), which I developed over time to standardize statements across time, despite 
large differences in stances before and after key changes in legality of abortion after Roe v. 
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Wade was decided in 1973.  Denominations that had not yet made an official statement 
on abortion were coded as silent, a code that applied to no group after 1970, when 
Lutheran Church in America and Presbyterian Church in the United States became the 
last groups to release official statements on abortion. All coding is based upon the group’s 
stance on abortion in the first trimester since very few stances explicitly discuss abortion 
in the second or third trimester. Within the statements, I look particularly at arguments 
about (1) the legality of abortion and (2) moral hesitations toward abortion. First, in 
considering what a denomination believes about the legality of abortion, I look 
particularly at discussion of support or disagreement toward laws at the state or federal 
level and personal circumstances when the group believes abortion should or should not 
be legally accessible. Second, in considering moral hesitation, I look at whether abortion 
is described as a moral choice in certain or all circumstances, not just whether it should be 
a legal choice.  Some statements could not be coded because they were only tangentially 
related to their stance on abortion. For example, a statement against forced abortions and 
sterilization in China by the Episcopal Church in 1994 could not be coded to understand 
the denomination’s stance on abortions by choice in the United States. In all, 86 official 
statements on abortion by Mainline Protestant institutions were coded and analyzed.  
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Table 4: Coding Scheme for Mainline Protestant Denominations 
Code Description 
SILENT No official stance about abortion yet.  
ANTI-CHOICE Criminalize abortion, although possible exception to prevent death of the mother.  
DOES NOT ACTIVELY 
SUPPORT CHOICE 
Does not actively support the legal right to choose abortion 
for any reason, but does not advocate for criminalization of 
abortion either. Either is not explicitly pro-choice or supports 
abortion access only under particular situations, such as 
health of mother, fetal deformity, rape or incest.  
STRONGLY 
QUALIFIED SUPPORT 
OF CHOICE 
Supports the choice of a woman to choose abortion, but 
strongly discourages it as a personal decision or focuses 
significant attention on the sanctity of human life. The 
support for choice might be explicitly advocating for legal 
freedom of choice or it might be more implicit in terms of 
support for freedom of personal moral choice or positively 
describing a woman “choosing” or “deciding” to have an 
abortion.  
SLIGHTLY QUALIFIED 
SUPPORT OF CHOICE 
Supports the legal right of a woman to choose abortion, but 
expresses some small moral hesitation toward abortion, such 
as through mentioning a desire to decrease the number of 
abortions or discussing some circumstances in which it might 
be a questionable choice.  
UNQUALIFIED 
SUPPORT OF CHOICE 
Supports the legal right of a woman to choose abortion and 
does not express moral hesitations about abortion.  
 
I contextualize my analysis of the official abortion stances by also examining 
archival materials and periodical articles, as described in Table 2 in the introduction. For 
each denomination, I look at internal institutional documents from the official 
denominational archives to better understand the development, debate about, and 
reception of these statements within the institutions. I also look at discussion of abortion 
in official denominational periodicals, looking at all issues from 1960-1973 and in the 
years around key shifts in their denominations’ abortion stances. To better understand 
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the beginning of the abortion debate within these institutions, before many of the 
institutions made their first stances, I also read and coded all articles that include the 
word “abortion” from 1960-1973 within key Protestant periodicals, including: (1) Christian 
Century, mainline Protestantism’s flagship non-denominational periodical, (2) Christianity 
and Crisis, mainline Protestantism’s liberal social action periodical; and (3) religious 
periodicals on the keyword “abortion” found in the Guide to Social Science and Religion in 
Periodical Literature. This periodical indexes many Mainline Protestant denominational 
periodicals, such as The Episcopalian, The Lutheran, Presbyterian Survey, and United Church 
Herald, as well as evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish periodicals, such as Christianity Today, 
Catholic World, and Jewish Spectator, in addition to more academic journals related to 
religion, such as Journal of the American Academy of Religion and Journal of Religion. Finally, I 
also draw on articles related to both abortion and religion in the New York Times, a 
mainstream secular periodical that provides a more comprehensive historical record of 
key events. 
  
SILENT OR ANTI-ABORTION FOR ALL MAINLINE PROTESTANT INSTITUTIONS BEFORE 
1962 
 Before the early-1960s, there was much silence on the issue of abortion among 
Mainline Protestant institutions. In the limited official discussion of abortion that did 
exist, these institutions were decidedly anti-abortion and linked it with infanticide. 
However, most denominations did not discuss abortion at all.  
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 The first group to take a stance on abortion was the United Presbyterian Church 
in the U.S.A.  It became anti-abortion in 1869, during the physician-led movement to 
restrict the availability of abortion around 1860-1880 (Mohr 1978). The statement 
regarded “the destructing of parents of their offspring, before birth, with abhorrence, as a 
crime against God and against nature; and as the frequency of such murders can no 
longer be concealed, we hereby warn those that are guilty of this crime that, except they 
repent, they cannot inherit eternal life” (United Presbyterian Church in the United States 
of America 1869: 937). No other official statements on abortion were made by a Mainline 
protestant institution until 1960. 
In the early 1960s, as birth control became an issue increasingly discussed in the 
United States with the advent of the “the Pill” and worries of a population explosion, the 
general American public and some Protestant institutions began to discuss abortion again, 
ending the “century of silence” on the issue (Luker 1984). The Mainline Protestant 
institutions that spoke out about the issue made it clear that, while they may support birth 
control usage, they absolutely did not approve abortion, which they grouped with 
infanticide. 
 Three key Mainline Protestant institutions took stances against abortion at this 
time, all supporting contraceptive usage but not abortion. The United Presbyterian 
Church in 1962 supported contraception to fight the social problem of overpopulation, 
but believed that “the fetus is a human life to be protected by the criminal law from the 
moment when the ovum is fertilized” (United Presbyterian Church in the United States 
of America 1962: 50). Top leaders in the Episcopal Church in 1960 endorsed birth 
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control as a method of family planning and for countries where population control was a 
concern, but also argued that “abortion and infanticide are to be condemned”  
("Episcopal Group Backs Birth Curb" 1960: 42), a position the Episcopal Church 
formally resolved in 1961 (Dugan 1961: 37).  The United Church of Christ, in its backing 
of aid for birth control in 1960, made it clear that they did not “condone the practice of 
abortion…Christian conscience cannot approve of abortion as a means of family 
planning, for it violates personality and involves the destruction of human life” 
("Responsible Parenthood and the Population Problem: A statement adopted by the 
Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ" 1960: 26). The 
National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., an ecumenical partnership of 
many Christian denominations, in its 1961 statement on “responsible parenthood,” 
approved birth control, but said “Protestant Christians are agreed in condemning 
abortion or any method which destroys human life except when the health or life of the 
mother is at stake” ("Text of Birth-Control Statement by Church Group" 1961: 16).  
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., American Lutheran Church, Lutheran 
Church in America, Presbyterian Church in the United States, and United Methodist 
Church remained silent on this issue until after the early-1960s.  
 
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN ABORTION DEBATE 
 This consensus around silence or anti-abortion stances among Mainline 
Protestant denominations declined as a new public debate about abortion arose 
throughout the country and as abortion became a salient social problem over the 1960s, 
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especially among religious institutions and leaders. By 1972, all of these Mainline 
Protestant institutions shifted to supporting choice about abortion. Drawing particularly 
on content analysis of inter- and non-denominational periodicals, I find that Mainline 
Protestants shifted their opinion rapidly, and their common opponent—Catholics—
helped unite them in lockstep with one another. 
 
Abortion Grows as an Issue, 1960-1965 
This general Protestant consensus that abortion was wrong and should be illegal 
except to save the life and possibly the health of the mother was disturbed when a story 
captured international attention. In 1962, Sherri Finkbine, a pregnant mother of four 
from Phoenix, took thalidomide, a drug used in Europe to minimize morning sickness 
that was starting to cause controversy because it caused severe fetal deformity.  When she 
learned about the risk of fetal deformity, her obstetrician immediately scheduled her an 
abortion in a hospital. Finkbine told her story to a friend who was a newspaper reporter 
and, with the ensuing media coverage, the hospital withdrew its permission for the 
operation. The “Finkbine Case,” as it came to be known, attracted international attention 
and Sherri Finkbine eventually flew to Sweden to have an abortion of what was later 
reported to be a severely deformed fetus (Becker 1962; Hunter 1962). With this case, the 
lack of uniformity in application of state abortion laws grew to be seen as a social problem 
by some. 
The Finkbine Case did not just stir up legal and medical debates, but also religious 
debates, primarily between Catholics on one hand and Protestants and Jewish leaders on 
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the other. As the New York Times reports, “clergymen pointed out that general Roman 
Catholic policy opposed the abortion, but Protestant and Jewish spokesmen appeared to 
condone it. The mother declined to give her religious affiliation until the operation has 
been performed” (Becker 1962: 22). Later, it came out that Sherri Finkbine was a 
Unitarian (Hunter 1962), and this liberal non-Protestant and nominally Christian 
denomination quickly became a leading religious voice in favor of legal abortion. During 
the story and its aftermath, Roman Catholic leaders were depicted as backward in their 
opposition to abortion rights. For example, a Unitarian minister in 1962 expressed hope 
that the Ecumenical Council could convince the Roman Catholic Church to “abandon 
its medieval resistance to family planning” ("Abortion is Backed by Unitarian Cleric" 
1962: 33). The Unitarian Universalist Association officially supported abortion law 
reform in 1963, overwhelmingly passing a resolution for abortion to be legal under 
expanded circumstances, such as risk to the physical or mental health of the woman, fetal 
defect, pregnancy due to rape or incest, or any other compelling reason ("Unitarians Urge 
Legal Abortions" 1963). 
Discussion of abortion in the public sphere increased rapidly starting around this 
time (see Figure 2), focusing especially on instances of fetal deformity sparked by 
thalidomide-caused fetal deformities in Europe, the 1962 Finkbine Case, and the 1962-
1965 rubella outbreak. Before 1960, most articles in the New York Times discussing 
abortion were related to prosecuting abortionists or abortion policies in other countries. 
After 1960 and especially after 1965, discussion of abortion started greatly increasing, 
focusing on fights over abortion laws in state legislatures, religious discussions about the 
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morality of abortion, and experiences of the women and doctors who were practically 
impacted by these laws.   
 
Figure 2: Articles that Mention "Abortion" in New York Times, 1940-197314 
 
 
Abortion Law Reform, 1965-1970 
General Mainline Protestant stances in the mid-1960s increasingly favored 
abortion law reform, often advocating for widening circumstances under which a woman 
could legally obtain an abortion but generally not advocating for “abortion on demand” 
(i.e. "Abortion by Consent" 1967). The Finkbine Case, along with other similar stories 
about abortion, led to growing calls during the mid- to late-1960s for reform of abortion 
laws at the state level to allow for more circumstances under which women could legally 
have an abortion. This abortion reform was based on a model law proposed initially in 
1959 by the American Law Institute (ALI), an independent organization composed of 
attorneys, judges, and law professors. This ALI model abortion reform law sought to 
clarify the reasons that a woman could legally obtain a therapeutic abortion to include a 
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wide range of reasons including the physical and mental health of the woman, fetal 
deformity, and pregnancy due to rape or incest.  
During this fight for abortion law reform, the debate was framed as a religious one 
primarily between anti-abortion Catholics and pro-abortion law reform Protestants and 
Jewish groups. The primary opposition to abortion law reform was from the Roman 
Catholic Church and the debate was framed as Catholics versus everybody else, 
especially Protestants and Jewish groups and leaders (Kinsolving 1964; Sibley 1966; 
Schanberg 1967b). As Christian Century, a Mainline Protestant periodical, reports, “the 
state legislature of New York has become a battleground between Catholic and Protestant 
groups in dispute over the issue of abortion reform” ("New York Religionists Embattled 
over Abortion Reform" 1969: 279). In particular, Episcopal leadership sparred with 
Catholic leadership on opposite sides of the abortion debate in state legislatures, from 
California ("Clerics on Coast in Abortion Clash" 1966) to New York (Mairoana 1967). 
Mainline Protestant tactics in favor of abortion law reform often centered around 
portraying Catholic leadership as backward on this issue. For example, in one Christian 
Century article, Catholic views on abortion were portrayed as changing over centuries and 
full of contradictions. The article went on to portray Catholics as simply another religious 
minority that had strange views on medicine that should not be taken seriously: 
Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists are minority 
groups which espouse unique and varying medical ethics in regard to resort to 
medical care, to blood transfusions or to therapeutic abortion in hospitals. 
However, the majority of the citizens…who can in perfectly good conscience 
utilize any or all of these practices should not have to submit to the views of a 
minority, no matter how strong, at the cost of their lives or their health. 
(Kinsolving 1964: 635) 
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A Christian Century editorial reported on a papal statement that “abortion is always murder 
and that a community which legalizes abortion is barbarous” and called it “plain rubbish 
[that] ought to be rejected” ("Papal Fallibility" 1970: 1309). Another Christian Century 
editorial countered the Archbishop of Boston’s forty-minute sermon that linked abortion 
reform to deaths in the Vietnam War by calling it “one of the least helpful of all recent 
utterances on abortion.” This editorial provided statistics about women’s deaths due to 
illegal abortions and a discussion of the social injustice of poor and nonwhite women 
lacking access to safe abortions while privileged women typically do have access 
("Abortion: Rhetoric and Reality" 1971: 871). Although ecumenicism between 
Protestants and Catholics was a goal that many were striving for at that time, abortion 
was described as having “quieted the ecumenical lullaby at least momentarily and 
aroused the fervor of deeply held convictions” (Green 1967: 109). 
Another strategy to delegitimize Catholic opposition to abortion reform was to 
portray Catholic leadership as misrepresentative of the predominant attitudes of the 
Catholic laity on abortion. For example, after a 1966 National Opinion Research Center 
national survey found that lay Catholics were actually not that different from lay 
Protestants in their general support for abortion law reform ("Reform Favored" 1966), 
one strategy the Council of Churches used was to pressure prominent liberal Catholics to 
support abortion law reform. Protestants sought to “organize Catholic lay support 
through reaching out to Catholic politicians, editors, businessmen, professional men and 
civic leaders mostly belonging to liberal organizations” (Schanberg 1967c: 1). Liberal 
Catholics had helped pass divorce liberalization laws in New York by going against 
official Roman Catholic views and there was hope among Protestants that liberal 
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Catholics could provide the same support in the abortion fight. Liberal Catholics reported 
feeling pressured at this time to support abortion law reform, which one self-described 
liberal Catholic who was ambivalent on the issue referred to as “the newest liberal cause” 
(Novak 1967: 430). In March 1967, the tactic was deemed successful when forty Catholic 
laymen released a statement in favor of abortion law reform (Schanberg 1967a). Tactics 
such as these demonstrate the extent to which supporters of abortion liberalization were 
focused on countering Catholic leadership opposition and portraying them as distinct 
from mainstream views.  
New York state legislature fights over abortion law reform provided a large stage 
for these religious fights to be carried out as local church councils organized in favor of 
abortion law reform in response to Catholic opposition. The New York State Council of 
Churches and the Protestant Council of Churches of NYC argued officially for abortion 
law reform in 1966 (Zion 1966). In 1967, Reform and Conservative Jewish organizations 
increasingly joined with the local New York Council of Churches in support of abortion 
law reform and in criticizing Catholic opposition (Fiske 1967a). While New York failed to 
pass abortion law reform, California passed abortion law reform in 1967, backed by the 
Northern and Southern California Councils of Churches and opposed by Catholics 
("California's Senate Votes to Ease Abortion Law" 1967). From 1967-1970, twelve states 
passed ALI-type bills, reforming their state abortion laws. Colorado, North Carolina, and 
California reformed first, in 1967, with many other states following suit.  Interestingly, 
these ALI-type abortion reform laws passed most easily in the typically conservative 
stronghold of the South because of the region’s lower percentage of Roman Catholics, 
who were the primary opponents of abortion reform (see Burns 2005). 
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Abortion Law Repeal, 1968-1973 
General Mainline Protestant stances shifted from approving abortion law reform 
(widening circumstances a woman could legally obtain an abortion), to increasingly 
arguing for complete abortion law repeal (allowing women to decide with their doctors if 
an abortion was warranted, or “abortion on demand”).  In late-1967, some voices in the 
public sphere began to turn from arguing for abortion under wider circumstances to just 
abolishing abortion laws and allowing women to decide as an elective medical procedure. 
In 1967, there was measured optimism for change when Colorado, North Carolina, and 
California became the first states to pass abortion law reform laws. At an international 
conference on abortion in Washington, D.C. in September 1967, there was a sense that 
the “logjam against abortion reform in this country had finally been breached,” but that 
even if abortion reform proceeds at a more accelerated pace, with twenty state legislatures 
expected to consider abortion reform in 1968, the changes would still be too minor 
(Graham 1967: 217). As Maryland, Georgia, Arkansas, New Mexico, Kansas, Oregon, 
Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia passed abortion reform laws in 1968-1970, there 
were increasing stories about how abortion law reform still did not allow many women to 
procure abortion in states where abortion reform had already passed (e.g. Fiske 1969; 
Monroe 1968) and doctors were concerned that the wording of laws were so vague that 
they could be sent to prison ("Abortion Experts" 1968). Abortion reform activists became 
increasingly concerned that these modest reform laws were still not enough, that many 
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women could still not procure abortions, and so these activists began to discuss a need for 
an outright repeal of abortion laws rather than the more moderate abortion law reform.  
New York had struggled and failed for a couple years to pass abortion law reform, 
and in 1968 leading voices in the state began arguing for outright repeal rather than 
continuing to fight for reform. Leading Protestant institutions in New York helped lead 
this new fight for repeal, providing a counterpoint to local Roman Catholic opposition. In 
February 1969, many New York synods of Protestant groups officially changed their 
position from supporting abortion law reform to supporting outright repeal, including the 
New York Council of Churches, the Council of Churches of the City of New York, the 
Presbytery of New York City, and the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of New York 
("Presbytery Urges Abortion Repeal" 1969; "Protestants Urge Repeal on Abortion" 1969; 
"State Protestants Now Back Repeal of Abortion Statute" 1969). Moreover, in the same 
month, the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL), headquartered 
in New York City, was founded during a national conference on abortion sponsored by 
the American Baptist Convention and the Unitarian Universalist Association ("New 
Group Will Seek Changes in Abortion Laws" 1969; Hunter 1969). 
Throughout this early history of abortion access as a social problem, articles in 
Protestant periodicals as well as the articles sampled in the New York Times often framed 
the debate as religious in nature. Abortion rights was described as an important social 
problem and sympathies in both Protestant periodicals and the New York Times articles 
sampled generally fell with those arguing for expanding abortion access. The main 
opponent in the fight was seen as Catholic leadership and tactics focused on 
delegitimizing its opposition by discussing Catholic leadership as medieval, backward, 
72 
 
and distant from lay Catholic attitudes. In this context, Mainline Protestant groups and 
leaders saw taking a progressive stand on abortion as very reasonable and respectable. In 
doing so, they were not just taking a stand for abortion rights, but also against Catholic 
leadership. 
 
MAINLINE PROTESTANTS ADVOCATE FOR EXPANDING ABORTION RIGHTS, 1966-1973 
 After these changes in the framing of abortion, all Mainline Protestant institutions 
began advocating for expanding abortion rights. Although this was a large and quick shift 
for these groups on this issue, there was surprising consensus and homogeneity in the 
timing and scope of these statements. The Protestant groups that either were silent or 
anti-abortion before 1962 began passing resolutions in favor of abortion law reform and 
repeal. Within a few years, by 1973, all groups advocated explicitly for choice on the issue 
of abortion. 
 Many Mainline Protestant denominations released initial statements arguing for 
abortion law reform: American Lutheran Church in 1966; American Baptist Convention 
and the Episcopal Church in 1967; the United Methodist Church in 1968; Lutheran 
Church in America and Presbyterian Church in the United States in 1970. These 
statements varied in their forcefulness on the issue. The American Lutheran Church, as 
part of their 1966 “Sexual Integrity in Modern Society” statement, argued vaguely that 
“there are times and circumstances when interruption of a pregnancy may be necessary 
for therapeutic reasons,” and advocated “adequate consultation with professional persons 
competent to give trustworthy and balanced counsel” (Larsen 1966: 491). The American 
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Baptist Convention was much more explicit in their 1967 statement, arguing that due to 
the “widespread practice of illegal abortion, with its attendant physical dangers and 
mental anguish,” “churches of the American Baptist Convention [should] support 
legislation in their states to make abortion legal in cases of rape, incest, mental 
incompetence, or where there is danger to the health of the mother” (American Baptist 
Convention 1967: 74). 
 Some denominations revised their previous reform statement to argue for outright 
repeal of abortion laws, whereas the United Church of Christ and the United 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. never released a reform statement and skipped right to 
a repeal statement. There were big differences between the abortion reform movement, 
which was composed of elite male professionals who wanted legal support for decisions 
they were already making for women, and the abortion repeal movement, which was 
composed of women seeking control of their bodies (Luker 1984). However, I find much 
continuity between reform and repeal stances within these Mainline Protestant 
institutions. While repeal positions put more emphasis on choice and decision making 
power than reform stances, both types of stances grappled with similar arguments, 
theological bases, and moral hesitations. Abortion law repeal statements were made by 
American Baptist Convention in 1968; American Lutheran Church and United 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. in 1970; United Church of Christ in 1971; and United 
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Methodist Church in 1972.15 By 1973, all Mainline Protestant institutions argued 
explicitly for choice on the issue of abortion.  
 There is surprising homogeneity in the timing and scope of these final abortion 
stances before the U.S. Supreme Court decriminalized abortion in their 1973 Roe v. Wade 
decision, demonstrating how legitimate and rational it was seen at that time for Mainline 
Protestant institutions to take a stance in favor of expanding abortion access. The 
American Baptists in 1968 urged that “legislation be enacted to provide that the 
termination of a pregnancy prior to the 12th week (first trimester) be at the request of the 
individual(s) concerned and be regarded as an elective medical procedure governed by 
the laws regulating medical practice and licensure” (American Baptist Convention 1968: 
125). The United Presbyterian Church in 1970 argued that “termination of pregnancy is 
a matter of the careful ethical decision of the patient...and therefore should not be 
restricted by law, except that it be performed...[by] a properly licensed physician” (United 
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America 1970: 891). The Episcopal Church 
in 1970 released a committee statement that argued that “statutory restrictions...with 
regard to abortion, be removed from criminal and penal codes” (Episcopal Church 1970: 
463).16  The American Lutheran Church in 1970 argued that the state should “confine its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A word of caution should be spoken in over-interpreting the exact years of these statements, as 
denominations vary in how often their general conferences meet to release resolutions. For example, the 
American Baptist Convention released a reform resolution in 1967 and then a repeal resolution in 1968, a 
quick change they were able to accomplish because they meet every year. In contrast, the United Methodist 
Church released a reform resolution in 1968 and then a repeal resolution in 1972, a slower change only 
because their general conference meets every four years.  
16 The Episcopal Church’s committee, the Joint Commission on the Church in Human Affairs, 
recommended the General Convention pass the abortion repeal stance as they passed the abortion reform 
stance. However, the Convention ran out of time to address many issues that year and so did not formally 
pass this resolution. There are no indications that they wouldn’t have as all the other Mainline Protestant 
denominations did.  
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statutory controls over induced abortion solely to the requirement that the operation be 
performed by a duly licensed physician in an appropriate medical setting” (Mickelson 
1970: 906). The Lutheran Church in America in 1970 argued, “a woman or couple may 
decide responsibly to seek an abortion” (Lutheran Church in America 1970: 483). The 
Presbyterian Church in the United States in 1970 argued, “abortion should be available 
to all who desire and qualify for it” (Presbyterian Church in the United States 1970: 124-
126). The United Church of Christ in 1971 argued for “the repeal of all legal prohibitions 
of physician-performed abortions” (United Church of Christ 1971: 132). Finally, in 1972, 
the United Methodist Church argued for “the removal of abortion from the criminal 
code, placing it instead under laws related to other procedures of standard medical 
practice” (United Methodist Church General Conference 1972: 1058). 
 Although there were massive and sudden shifts in abortion stances among these 
Mainline Protestant denominations, there was surprising consensus about those changes 
and within a few years all groups explicitly advocated for choice about abortion (See 
Table 5). In 1962, all Mainline Protestant denominations were either silent or explicitly 
anti-choice. By 1968, there were some groups that supported expanding abortion access, 
although only one group, American Baptists, supported unqualified choice on abortion. 
By 1973, all Mainline Protestant denominations supported choice on abortion, although 
they varied on how much they qualified their support for that choice. Although abortion 
was a highly controversial debate in American discourse over this time period, there was 
a surprising amount of consensus within and among Mainline Protestant denominations 
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that the legitimate stance for a religious group to take was anti-choice in 1962 and pro-
choice by 1973. 
Table 5: Official Denominational Stances on Abortion in 1962, 1968, and 1973  
Stance 1962 1968 1973 
Silent American Baptist, 
American Lutheran, 
Lutheran Church in 
America,  
Presbyterian Church 
in the US,  
United Methodist 
Church 
Lutheran Church in 
America,  
Presbyterian Church 
in the US, 
— 
Anti-choice 
Episcopal Church,  
United Church of 
Christ, 
United Presbyterian 
United Presbyterian,  
United Church of 
Christ,  
— 
Does not 
actively support 
choice 
— 
Episcopal Church, 
American Lutheran,  
United Methodist 
— 
Strongly 
qualified 
support of 
choice 
— — 
Presbyterian Church in 
the US,  
United Methodist 
Slightly 
qualified 
support of 
choice 
— — 
American Lutheran, 
Lutheran Church in 
America 
Unqualified 
support of 
choice 
— American Baptist, 
American Baptist,  
Episcopal Church,  
United Presbyterian,  
United Church of Christ 
 
 This period of time in the late 1960s and early 1970s was a time in which 
Mainline Protestant institutions were playing a growing role in debates on social problems 
and activism, a focus that emerged out of the role of the churches in the cycle of protest 
during the Civil Rights Movement (Staggenborg 1991). The United Methodist Church, 
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for example, by the end of the 1960s had become a heavily urbanized and bureaucratized 
institution that was struggling to deal with the national and global conflicts that were 
arising at the time. During the late-1960s and early-1970s intellectual theological 
arguments were sidelined as social activism became the prime concern for the church 
(Norwood 1974). As the denomination was restructured in 1968, a new Statement of 
Social Principles was written to update previous denominational social creeds, 
mentioning support for conscientious objectors to war, remarriage of divorced people, 
gay rights, birth control, limits to population growth, and approval of abortion reform. 
Through examining these Mainline Protestant denominational internal documents, it is 
clear that all of these institutions became more bureaucratic and focused their growing 
staff and committees increasingly on social activism, especially liberal causes such as 
poverty, racial injustice, the Vietnam War, environmental degradation, and abortion. 
 There was a sense among some of these Mainline Protestant denominations that 
the legitimate stance on abortion was the most liberal stance on abortion. For example, 
within the United Church of Christ, the legitimacy of liberal stances on abortion was so 
taken for granted that two committees competed for greater legitimacy in releasing social 
statements for the denomination by issuing competing liberal stances on abortion. At that 
time in the United Church of Christ, two different committees, the Council of Christian 
Social Action (CCSA) and the much larger and more powerful Board of Homeland 
Ministries (BHM), both made social statements and, with questions of overlapping and 
competitive missions, both fought to maintain their position.  CCSA minutes and 
correspondence demonstrate that they felt vulnerable about maintaining their committee 
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relative to the larger organization. The CCSA believed that it could “only justify its 
existence if it is a sharp cutting edge of the church” and “fulfill[s] a prophetic role at the 
forefront of social change with the courage to speak fearlessly and forthrightly,” generally 
in favor of social liberalism.17  In 1967, the Sixth General Synod of the United Church of 
Christ referred both committees to study the moral and legal aspects of abortion and 
sterilization (United Church of Christ 1967: 98). As the CCSA developed their statement, 
they continually looked to the BHM attempts at statements and believed that their own 
statement should be more liberal and forceful to be the one to be accepted by the United 
Church of Christ.18 When the CCSA’s statement appeared to be going forward to the 
General Synod of the United Church of Christ, the BHM argued that it was insufficiently 
concerned with racial injustice and challenged it with the Synod.19 Within a few months, 
it was clear to the CCSA that the Synod preferred the BHM statement on abortion20 and 
the CCSA endorsed the BHM statement that was eventually passed, with some 
amendment, by the United Church of Christ General Synod (Bock 1971). Throughout 
this lead up to a denominational official statement on abortion, the premise that the most 
liberal statement possible should be passed was largely unquestioned by both committees. 
 These shifting abortion stances were relatively uncontroversial within the 
Mainline Protestant denominations at the time. The final abortion repeal statement by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See United Church of Christ Archives. United Church of Christ 90-9 Council for Christian Social Action 
Collection. Box 2, Folder 8 “CCSA Minutes February 1973” 
18 See United Church of Christ Archives. United Church of Christ 90-9 Council for Christian Social Action 
Collection. Box 2, Folder 3 “CCSA Minutes, September 1970.”  
19 See United Church of Christ Archives. United Church of Christ 90-9 Council for Christian Social Action 
Collection. Box 2, Folder 4 “CCSA Minutes, February 1971.” Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Council for 
Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ, February 6-7 1971. 
20 See United Church of Christ Archives. United Church of Christ 90-9 Council for Christian Social Action 
COllection. Box 2, Folder 5, “CCSA minutes, September 1971.” Report of the Executive Director. 
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the United Church of Christ was supported by 58% of surveyed UCC churches and 82% 
of Synod delegates and passed with an overwhelming 523 to 51 vote (United Church of 
Christ 1971: 132). After American Baptists passed their statement advocating unqualified 
support of choice in 1968, the first Mainline Protestant denomination to pass a repeal 
stance, they mentioned it rather low and tepidly in their official press release. They 
portrayed it as uncontroversial and positive relative to other denominational statements 
about abortion at the time: “Delegates approved a resolution on abortion which was 
described by a resolutions committee spokesman as the most direct and far reaching 
statement by any denomination on this subject to date.”21 The Lutheran Church in 
America debated many aspects of their 1970 “Sex, Marriage, and Family” statement, 
including the meaning of marriage, premarital sex, interracial marriage, and 
homosexuality, before approving the statement. However, there was no debate on the 
relatively less controversial topic of abortion repeal within that statement, which argued 
that “a woman or couple may decide responsibly to seek an abortion” and the only 
amendment was simply to insert the word “therapeutic” before the word “abortion” in 
the last paragraph (Lutheran Church in America 1970: 483, 654). 
 The American Lutheran Church had by far the most controversy about its 
abortion statement. In their very long statement on “Abortion, Christian Counsel, and 
the Law,” they acknowledged much disagreement on the issue and that “abortion is a 
loaded word” (Mickelson 1970: 904). Their discussion of abortion in 1974 sheds light on 
the way that the debate disturbed their ecumenical relations with other anti-abortion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See American Baptist Historical Library. American Baptist News Service Group Collection. Folder 3, 
“A.B. News Service 1968 (2).” June 6, 1968 “ABC Ends 61st Annual Meeting.” 
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groups. They called abortion “a deeply divisive issue among the churches, threatening the 
achievements in ecumenical relations of The ALC with other churches, especially 
Catholics and Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod” (The American Lutheran Church 
1974: 654). No other group expressed concerns during their convention debates that their 
abortion statements might disturb ecumenical relationships with Catholics, the key 
institutional opponent of abortion rights in the United States at that time.  
 
 Shortly after these Mainline Protestant denominations explicitly advocated for 
choice on abortion, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton to 
decriminalize abortion. Although these decisions acted as moral shocks for many to 
mobilize in pro-life activism (Luker 1984; Ginsburg 1989), there was more continuity 
than change after 1973 within these large, moderate and mainstream Mainline Protestant 
institutions in their abortion stances. These institutions largely felt as though they had 
won, celebrated the decision, and continued to express their official approval of choice in 
abortion through the 1970s, although moral hesitations were often reiterated. The United 
Church of Christ “affirm[ed]” the Supreme Court decision, “commend[ed]” their own 
denomination instrumentalities “that have influenced abortion reform” and “urge[d] 
pastors, members, local churches, Conferences and Instrumentalities to resist attempts to 
erode or negate the recent Supreme Court decision as well as to strengthen state and local 
efforts in this regard” (United Church of Christ 1973: 78). The United Church of Christ 
again praised the Supreme Court decision in 1977 and 1979. In 1976, the Episcopal 
Church reaffirmed its position in support of choice and “its unequivocal opposition to any 
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legislation on the part of the national or state governments which would abridge or deny 
the rights of individuals to reach informed decisions in this matter and to act upon them,” 
though at the same time it did not advocate for “abortions for convenience”  (Episcopal 
Church 1977: C-3). The United Presbyterian Church in 1978 “reaffirm[ed] the right of 
personal choice in regard to termination of pregnancy, while deploring the necessity for 
and frequency of such choices; and affirms the right of each woman to competent medical 
care in connection with this choice” (United Presbyterian Church in the United States of 
America 1978: 67). Although there was much agitation against abortion among pro-life 
activists, Mainline Protestant institutions appear relatively uninterested in reconsidering 
their support of choice on abortion during the 1970s.  
 
CONSENSUS DECLINES AND BELIEFS DIVERGE 
 The early debate around abortion within Mainline Protestant institutions was not 
marked by polarization and controversy, but by consensus and moderation. After the 
rapid liberalization on abortion from 1966-1972, Mainline Protestant denominations 
generally concurred with one another that there should be a legal right to choose on 
abortion, although that decision should be considered with hesitation and sensitivity to 
the particular circumstances of the abortion. Although some individuals experienced a 
moral shock after Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973 and entered pro-life activism, Mainline 
Protestant institutions passed official pronouncements in support of the decision and 
individuals within denominational leadership saw the decision as a win. Some individuals 
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in denominational conventions spoke out against the decision, but overall the larger 
institutions ignored these pro-life voices. 
 This consensus around support for choice within Mainline Protestant institutions 
increasingly broke down over the 1980s, particularly around 1988, for many institutions. 
From 1987-1992, four of the Mainline Protestant institutions added new stipulations and 
greater moral hesitations in their support of abortion rights, but maintained their historic 
support of choice. However two of the Mainline Protestant institutions backed off from 
their previous stance and no longer explicitly advocated for a woman’s right to choose.  
 I will describe and explain these shifts from 1987-1992 within these 
denominations in much greater detail in the next chapter, but first the overall trend 
among all denominations over time needs to be understood. The polarization and 
controversy of abortion stances within Protestant denominations was not prominent in 
the early debate around abortion in the 1960s and 1970s, but emerged in the late 1980s. 
My coding of 86 official denominational statements on abortion made it clear that in the 
late 1980s the consensus and moderation around the right to choose on abortion broke 
down and Mainline Protestant institutions polarized. From 1987-1992, all six Mainline 
Protestant denominations added greater moral hesitation to their statements on abortion, 
but two denominations backed away from explicit support of choice for the first time 
since 1972 (See Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Coding of Abortion Stances of Mainline Protestant Denominations, 1960-
201222
 
 
 While there was great shifting in abortion stances from 1960-1975, denominations 
all conformed to a similar pattern and settled rapidly on agreement of support for choice 
on abortion, although they differed in how much moral hesitation they described in their 
support. From 1972-1987, all Mainline Protestant denominations agreed that a woman 
should have the legal right to choose to have an abortion and the focus in statements 
remained on how denominations could help advise women in this choice. It was not until 
the period from 1987-1992 when all denominations reconsidered their abortion stances 
that suddenly there arose disagreement between denominations about whether women 
should legally and morally be able to choose an abortion. No Mainline Protestant 
denomination has become anti-choice like Catholic and some Evangelical Protestant 
denominations are. However, the support of choice on abortion that Mainline Protestants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Due to mergers, while there are 8 Mainline Protestant denominations whose abortion stances are coded 
starting in 1960, there are 6 Mainline Protestant denominations at the end of the time period. To ease 
interpretation of this already complicated figure, predecessor denominations and merged denominations 
are colored similarly. This figure should be interpreted to understand the broad trends in abortion stances 
among all Mainline Protestant institutions through time rather than seeking to follow a single Mainline 
Protestant institution through time.  
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84 
 
rallied around in opposition of Catholic leaders from 1966-1972 no longer united these 
denominations by the early 1990s. 
 The divide between these denominations on choice on abortion that arose from 
1987-1992 persists until today (see Table 6). From 1992-today, four denominations 
concretized their stance of explicit support of choice on abortion with some qualifications. 
None of the denominations that continue to explicitly support choice voice the significant 
qualifications that some denominations did in earlier time periods. From 1992-today, two 
denominations continue not to explicitly support choice, but they did not become 
explicitly anti-choice. These denominations sought to remove themselves from the debate 
and sit on the fence, a balance that they maintain today. 
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Table 6: Official Denominational Stances on Abortion in 1973, 1980, 1992, and 2012  
Stance 1973 1980 1992 2012 
Silent — — — — 
Anti-choice — — — — 
Does not 
actively 
support 
choice 
— — 
American Baptist, 
 Evangelical 
Lutheran 
Church in 
America 
American 
Baptist, 
 Evangelical 
Lutheran 
Church in 
America 
Strongly 
qualified 
support of 
choice 
Presbyterian 
Church in the 
US,  
United Methodist 
American 
Lutheran,  — — 
Slightly 
qualified 
support of 
choice 
American 
Lutheran,  
Lutheran Church 
in America 
Episcopal 
Church,  
Lutheran Church 
in America,  
Presbyterian 
Church in the 
US,  
United Methodist 
Episcopal Church,  
Presbyterian 
Church (USA),   
United Church of 
Christ,  
United Methodist 
Church 
Episcopal 
Church,  
Presbyterian 
Church 
(USA),   
United Church 
of Christ,  
United 
Methodist 
Church 
Unqualified 
support of 
choice 
American Baptist,  
Episcopal Church,  
United 
Presbyterian,  
United Church of 
Christ 
American Baptist,  
United 
Presbyterian,  
United Church of 
Christ 
— — 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Although the politics of abortion access are described as the quintessential culture 
war issue, in fact there is much about the debate that does not conform to expectations of 
a culture war. Conflicts around culture war issues, particularly abortion, are seen as 
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emerging out of fundamentally different worldviews and sources of moral authority. 
According to Luker (1984), pro-life views come out of a worldview centered around God 
and pro-choice views come out of a worldview centered on humans. However, among 
Mainline Protestant institutions the same worldview centered around God is drawn on to 
justify both pro-life and pro-choice stances at different points in time. There is remarkable 
change over time in beliefs about abortion among Mainline Protestant institutions, 
demonstrating that the relationship between beliefs on abortion and worldview is not 
straightforward or static in the way scholars have described. 
 Abortion politics have remained controversial in the wider society since the 1960s, 
but among Mainline Protestant institutions the debate was marked by much consensus 
and moderation until the late 1980s. Even as all denominations rapidly shifted their 
stance on abortion from 1966-1972, moving from silent and anti-choice to explicitly pro-
choice, the denominations moved in tandem with one another. There was also much 
similarity among all denominations from 1987-1992 as all reconsidered their abortion 
stances and added greater moral hesitation around the morality of abortion. However, 
whereas the shifts from 1966-1972 were marked by consensus, the shifts from 1987-1992 
were marked by great conflict and polarization. Whereas explicit support for choice on 
abortion was something that all Mainline Protestant denominations had upheld since 
1972, two denominations diverged from this long-held consensus and no longer explicitly 
supported a right to choice. Why did this consensus about the appropriate stance on 
abortion decline over time and why did some Mainline Protestant denominations back 
away from their support of choice? This question will be taken up in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND OPPONENTS: ABORTION AND 
RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURING SINCE 1960 
	  
INTRODUCTION 
 The shifting abortion stances among Mainline Protestant institutions over time, as 
described in Chapter 2, demonstrate surprising homogeneity and consensus. In the early-
1960s, no Mainline Protestant institutions supported expanding abortion access. Over 
1966-1972, all the most prominent Mainline Protestant institutions released official 
pronouncements in favor of relaxing abortion laws. Since this time, especially from 1987-
1992, all the most prominent Mainline Protestant institutions faced greater internal 
debate over the issue and all shifted in a more conservative direction. However, while 
most denominations just added new moral hesitations and continued their support of 
choice on abortion, two of the denominations diverged from the others and no longer 
explicitly supported choice. While the 1960s and 1970s politics of abortion among 
Mainline Protestant institutions was marked by consensus around the appropriate 
Protestant stance on abortion, over the 1980s conflict and polarization arose. Why did 
institutionalized Mainline Protestant abortion stances shift in tandem with one another as 
they did? Why were the shifts in 1966-1972 marked by consensus whereas the shifts from 
1987-1992 were marked by such controversy? Why did some Mainline Protestant 
denominations diverge from the general pattern from 1987-1992 and no longer explicitly 
support choice on abortion? 
88 
 
 Using archival materials and periodical articles of a sample of Mainline Protestant 
denominations, as described in Table 2 in the Introduction, I compare both two different 
time periods (1966-1972 vs. 1987-1992) and different sets of Mainline Protestant 
denominations (those that continued to explicitly support choice vs. those that did not). 
One interdenominational social movement organization proved to be the key site where 
Mainline Protestants engaged in discourse and advocacy on the issue of abortion and is 
given particular attention in this chapter. This pro-choice organization, the Religious 
Coalition for Abortion Rights (RCAR), was examined through an analysis of its key 
periodical, Options, from 1973-today, and through its official archive located at the United 
Methodist Archives and History Center in Madison, NJ. 
 I argue that abortion fights have provided fertile ground upon which religious 
groups negotiated understandings of themselves, the role of religion in American public 
life, and boundaries with other religious groups.  As described in Chapter 2, during the 
first wave of abortion pronouncements, from 1966-1972, Mainline Protestants used 
abortion as a key issue to challenge Catholic political power more broadly.  After the 
decriminalization of abortion in 1973, Mainline Protestant and Jewish groups organized 
together to challenge Catholic leadership attempts to overturn the decision, using 
abortion as a key issue to challenge Catholics. However, as Evangelical Protestants 
became increasingly politically engaged on the pro-life side of the debate, the “opponent” 
for these pro-choice religious social movement organizations shifted from Catholics to 
Evangelicals. This rising mobilization of evangelicals did not just come from outside the 
Mainline Protestant denominations, but increasingly from within them. Fights over 
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abortion within denominations proved to be important sites for larger fights over the role 
of religious groups in politics and for contesting the symbolic boundary between 
Evangelical Protestants and Mainline Protestants. In the second wave of abortion 
pronouncements, from 1987-1992, Mainline Protestants used abortion as a key issue, 
either to create greater ties with or to better distinguish themselves from Evangelical 
Protestants.  
 These shifts in stances on abortion occurred within the context of religious 
restructuring, as the salient divide in the religious field shifted from being between 
denominations, to being increasingly between liberals and conservatives of all 
denominations. Religious institutions used abortion stances as a way to navigate changing 
salient symbolic boundaries in the religious field. Realignment occurs through arguing 
over contentious and salient social issues. The underlying reasons for the religious 
realignment since the 1960s are described by Wuthnow (1988) and include the expansion 
of the federal government, the growth of special-interest groups, and the expansion but 
unequal access to education. I argue that fights over stances on abortion allowed these 
shifting boundaries to become salient to people and provided the institutional connections 
and rationale for shifting the boundaries. As institutionalized stances on abortion shifted, 
so did salient boundaries within and between religious institutions. 
 
DENOMINATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURING 
 While denominational affiliation, especially whether one was a Protestant, a 
Catholic, or a Jew, played a defining role in American’s public identities before the 1960’s 
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(Herberg 1955), after the 1960’s salient boundaries increasingly cut across 
denominational lines. Wuthnow (1988) argues that a religious realignment occurred after 
the social turmoil of the 1960s, in which the differential expansion of higher education 
and the proliferation of religious “special purpose groups” have caused the middle to 
collapse, leaving a growing divide between liberals and conservatives. With this religious 
“restructuring,” denominations have been less able to hold the middle ground that they 
long had and have become less cohesive and more internally polarized.  
 At the same time that religious restructuring has occurred, particular social issues, 
especially focused on sexuality, have become increasingly salient and controversial. 
Scholars have consistently demonstrated that the United States has a common set of core 
values, such as individualism, that both liberals and conservatives share (Bellah 1970; 
Bellah et al. 1985; Baker 2005; Thomson 2010). However, American political discourse 
has long remained divided on a basket of particular salient social issues. Today the issues 
of abortion and gay marriage are particularly salient and distinguish American political 
parties (Fiorina et al. 2011), while in the nineteenth century prohibition and abolition 
were the defining salient polarizing issues (Young 2006). In addition to salient social 
issues, particular moral issues have always arisen as wedge issues between political 
interests in the United States (Morone 2003). Beliefs about these moral issues dominate 
political debates and political alignments (Brooks 2000; Leege et al. 2002; Brint and 
Abrutyn 2009; Fiorina et al. 2011). Religious institutions have long been asked to be key 
leaders in these moral issues and have been pushed to take stances on controversial moral 
issues, even though these debates often alienate certain members and foster conflict 
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within the institutions (Ammerman 1995; Chaves 1997; Dillon 1999; Young 2002; Moon 
2004; Young 2006; Wilde 2007; Wilde and Danielsen 2013) 
 
WHAT DETERMINES HOW RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS DEAL WITH CONTENTIOUS SOCIAL 
ISSUES? 
How do religious institutions determine the appropriate stance on a salient 
controversial social issue? Some might have an immediate reaction that religious 
institutions simply base their stances on controversial social issues upon their religious 
beliefs or in reference to their religious text. However, even for issues in which there is a 
clear statement in a religious text, religious groups can have deeply divisive debates about 
how to interpret those statements. For example, “Thou shalt not kill” of the Ten 
Commandments is a quite clear statement, but has been used on both sides of the capital 
punishment debate.  In the case of abortion, there is no explicit statement in the Bible, 
the key religious text of Christian churches, that specifies circumstances under which an 
abortion is or is not permitted. Yet Christian churches have long been making these sorts 
of statements and religious institutions selectively quote different parts of religious texts to 
make their own points. Religious stances on controversial social issues do not emerge 
neatly out of religious beliefs or in reference to religious text, but rather are collectively 
constructed drawing from a wide range of beliefs and social relationships. Scholars have 
put forward multiple theories that could help explain how religious institutions deal with 
contentious social issues.  
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Social movement theories would suggest that religious institutions shift their 
stances about contentious issues in response to successful social movement activity on 
those issues. There are many theories about what makes a social movement successful, 
including mobilizing resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977), the opening of political 
opportunities (McAdam 1982), the innovation of social movement tactics (McAdam 
1983), and whether a social movement’s frame resonates with the general public (Snow et 
al. 1986). These theories would suggest that Mainline Protestant denominations shifted in 
response to successful social movement activity on these issues. 
Within the sociology of religion, increasing attention in recent decades has been 
paid to the interactions between religious institutions and competition among them for 
potential members, what qualities make a religious institution more competitive, and how 
this competition corresponds to changes within the wider religious field. With the rise of 
the “new paradigm,” also commonly referred to as “supply-side” theories, many scholars 
have argued that religious diversity increases overall religious participation in a society 
and that religious institutions compete for potential constituents (Warner 1993; Finke and 
Stark 1998; Finke and Stark 2005), although very few have directly looked at how this 
competition occurs (Wilde 2007). This theory would suggest that these mainstream 
denominations assess what their constituents believe about a contentious issue and take 
that stance as a way “market” to their members and other potential members. Moreover, 
supply-siders argue that stricter religious institutions are more competitive in retaining 
members and encouraging religious switching (Iannaccone 1994; Sherkat and Wilson 
1995; Sherkat 2001), although many have questioned the basic assumptions underlying 
this “strict churches are strong” thesis (Demerath III 1995; Hout et al. 2001). This theory 
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would suggest that constituents or potential constituents were perceived by the Mainline 
Protestant denominations as concerned about access to abortion and that institutions 
shaped their abortion stance to best market to these people. 
Neoinstitutional theory argues that organizations compete within an 
“organizational field,” or all the other organizations that offer similar products or 
services, which influences their behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). They compete 
amongst one another not just for resources and members, but also for legitimacy in the 
eyes of the other institutions in the field. Thus, unlike supply-side theory, neoinstitutional 
theory would predict that religious institutions compete with other religious institutions 
not for members, but for legitimacy and prestige within the organizational field. When an 
organization field becomes “structurated,” or well-defined, as the religious field is, the 
field becomes very powerful in influencing organizations within that field and 
organizations become increasingly homogenous in their structure and actions 
(“institutional isomorphism”).  Neoinstitutional theory would predict that religious 
institutions would change their structure and behavior to fit the norm within the field and 
to appear rational to other religious institutions, a prediction that has held up within 
studies of religious change (Chaves 1996; Wilde 2007). This theory would suggest that 
Mainline Protestant institutions are taking a particular stance on abortion with an 
awareness of what other institutions are doing on the issue and seeking to take the most 
“legitimate” stance and that they are not responding primarily to social movement or 
member pressure, but primarily to organizational pressure. It would suggest that 
Mainline Protestant denominations saw abortion liberalization as necessary to appear 
legitimate in the eyes of other Mainline Protestant denominations and that, in the well-
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defined religious field, institutions would take very similar action on the issue of abortion 
out of this powerful organizational pressure.  
 
I argue that all three of these factors, social movement, religious marketing, and 
organizational pressure, play a role to some degree in understanding shifting abortion 
stances among religious institutions. First, there has been tremendous and sustained social 
movement mobilization on the issue of abortion since 1960. Religious institutions have 
been involved both as actors and as targets of these social movement organizations. 
Moreover, different framing of the abortion debate has resonated at different times with 
different institutions. Second, there has been some awareness and concern about the 
abortion beliefs of members in the pews. Religious institutions have expressed concern 
about how best to counsel their members who are considering abortion to deal with their 
problem pregnancies. However, I argue that institutional concerns about legitimacy and 
boundaries between other religious institutions are much more important in explaining 
religious institutions’ stances on abortion over time.  
While all Mainline Protestant denominations faced concerns about pro-life 
members and pro-life social movement mobilization, the factor that distinguishes those 
groups that backed away from explicitly supporting choice and those that maintained 
support of choice was institutional concern about boundaries with Evangelical Protestant 
denominations. Those groups that sought to encourage connections with Evangelical 
Protestants over the 1980s backed away from choice on abortion. Those groups that 
sought to remain firmly Mainline Protestant in orientation and fought Evangelical 
Protestant forces within them took a stand on choice on abortion. These denominations 
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were willing to add greater moral hesitations to their statements on abortion but 
remained firm that they should remain explicitly supportive of choice on abortion and 
remain part of social movement organization efforts to defend a legal right to choice. I 
argue that institutionalized stances on controversial issues do not simply emerge out of 
worldview and sources of moral authority, as many culture war scholars would argue, but 
rather are a key way that institutions construct boundaries between themselves and 
others. For Mainline Protestants, stances on abortion have provided the rationale and 
legitimacy for both institutional connections and institutional oppositions and are a key 
tool to facilitate religious restructuring. The salience of culture war issues is not simply an 
outcome of religious restructuring, but is a key way that religious restructuring occurred 
and became salient. 
 
MAINLINE PROTESTANTS ORGANIZE IN SUPPORT OF ROE V. WADE 
 Throughout the 1970s, there remained remarkable consensus in support of choice 
on abortion among Mainline Protestant institutions and Protestants joined together 
against Catholic anti-abortion advocacy. As described in chapters 1 and 2, during the 
1960s and early 1970s changes in the discourse of abortion, the rise of Mainline 
Protestant clergy involved in the abortion rights movement after their involvement in the 
civil rights movement, and fears of Catholic political power led Mainline Protestants to 
support abortion law reform and repeal. There is surprising homogeneity in the timing 
and scope of these abortion stances, demonstrating how Mainline Protestant institutions 
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saw taking a stance in favor of expanding abortion access to be a legitimate and rational 
step. 
 Shortly after the first wave of Protestant pronouncements in favor of abortion law 
reform or repeal from 1966-1972, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. 
Bolton to decriminalize abortion. Immediately, the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops sought to overturn the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision through a 
constitutional amendment. In response, national leaders of Mainline Protestant, Reform 
and Conservative Judaism, as well as other religious organizations joined together to try 
to counter this Catholic leadership mobilization, in the form of the Religious Coalition for 
Abortion Rights (RCAR). The sixteen religious organizations that founded the Coalition 
had many areas of difference and had adopted often quite differing positions on abortion 
rights. Nevertheless, they felt it necessary to create a common front to oppose the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops. RCAR was the national ecumenical 
organization that would join together these 16 religious groups to counteract Catholic 
leadership on the issue of abortion.  More Mainline Protestant, Jewish and other religious 
organizations would join RCAR over the next several years (see Table 7). 
97 
 
Table	  7:	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  Abortion	  Rights	  Membership,	  1978	   
Organization Date Joined 
Founding Members  
American Baptist Churches, Division of Social Ministries 1973  
(withdrew 1985) 
United Church of Christ, Board of Homeland Ministries 1973 
United Church of Christ, Council of Christian Social Action 1973 
United Methodist Church, Board of Church and Society  1973 
United Methodist Church, Women’s Division of the Board of Global 
Ministries 
1973 
United Presbyterian Church USA, Church and Society Unit 1973 
United Presbyterian Church USA, Washington Offices 1973 
United Presbyterian Church USA, Women’s Program Unit 1973 
B’nai B’rith Women 1973 
Church of the Brethren, Washington Office 1973  
(withdrew 1975) 
Catholics for a Free Choice 1973 
National Council of Jewish Women 1973 
National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods 1973 
Union of American Hebrew Congregations 1973 
Unitarian Universalist Association 1973 
Unitarian Universalist Women’s Federation 1973 
 
Joining Members 
 
American Ethical Union 1974 
American Ethical Union, National Women’s Conference 1974 
Presbyterian Church in the US, General Executive Board 1974 
Presbyterian Church in the US, Committee on Women’s Concerns 1974 
Young Women’s Christian Association 1974 
Women’s League for Conservative Judaism 1974 
American Jewish Congress, National Women’s Division 1974 
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Division of Homeland 
Ministries 
1976 
Lutheran Church in America, Division for Mission in North 
America 
1977  
(withdrew 1978) 
United Synagogue of America 1978 
Episcopal Women’s Caucus 1978  
 
 RCAR initially emerged out of existing religious lobbying networks and 
institutions in Washington, D.C., which were constrained by their Catholic ecumenicism 
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in lobbying about abortion. All major Mainline Protestant denominations have long had 
offices in Washington, D.C., which “function as interest groups by representing the 
political interest of the denominations and coordinating their national advocacy efforts” 
(Olson 2002: 55). These offices lobby Congress, file amicus briefs on key judicial cases, 
and connect with social movement organizations (SMOs) to mobilize on key social issues. 
An organizational forum in which religious groups could discuss politics and social issues 
already existed in Washington, D.C.: the Washington Inter-Religious Staff Council 
(WISC). Because WISC included Catholic groups, an agreement was made not to discuss 
the abortion issue, thus the other groups decided there was a need to form a separate 
organization to focus on abortion policy (Staggenborg 1991: 195). Informal meetings by 
staff members of different religious groups’ Washington offices led key D.C.-based 
denominational leaders, especially in the United Methodist General Board of Church and 
Society, to coordinate with other pro-choice groups such as Planned Parenthood, 
NARAL, the Women’s Political Caucus, the ACLU to institutionalize support for the 
new Roe v. Wade decision (Mills 1991: 569). Anticipating pressure from Right-to-Life 
groups on Congress and hoping to even out the pressure, they sought to get involved with 
this informal coalition and created an “Abortion Rights Project” to coordinate their 
religious institutional efforts. They saw the coalition as only temporary, lasting probably 
12 months, not anticipating the continued politics around abortion.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 RCAR was formed underneath the umbrella of the United Methodist General Board of Church and 
Society, primarily due to avoidance of the bureaucracy involved in setting up a separate organization and 
because RCAR organizers thought it would be a temporary organization (Staggenborg 1991: 195). RCAR 
eventually became incorporated and autonomous organization, no longer underneath the wing of the 
United Methodist Church in 1981, after concerns from a 1977 IRS review cast doubt on the tax-deductible 
nature of RCAR contributions and the degree to which they were or were not controlled by the UMC (See 
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 RCAR’s main goal from the beginning was to demonstrate the wide diversity of 
religious opinions on the issue of abortion to counteract the arguments by Catholic 
leaders at the time that religious groups agreed that life began at conception. In June 
1973, the Project explained the rationale for action in terms of Protestants and Jews 
creating a moral argument for abortion rights to counteract the Catholic anti-abortion 
effort:  
The campaign to nullify the recent Supreme Court decision is massive, emotional, 
well-financed, multipronged, and growing in momentum…The intensity and high 
visibility of such activities has created a climate in which policy-makers and office 
holders are extremely hesitant to take actions which will threaten them with defeat 
at the next election if they take the ‘wrong’ stance…The most vital response must 
clearly come from those religious bodies who have declared themselves in favor of 
the right to abortion, a group that includes most major Protestant and Jewish 
churches.24 
They wanted to show that religious groups had no consensus on when life began and the 
morality of abortion. Further, they argued that any outlawing of abortion in a 
constitutional amendment would upset the boundary between Church and State and 
would be putting Catholic understandings of abortion and fetal life into law. Most of their 
mobilization at this time focused on countering efforts by the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, trying to meet with the same politicians that the Catholic leadership 
was meeting with, and trying to challenge Catholic framing of the abortion issue. While 
they cared about the issue of abortion, certainly, a large part of their rationale, as 
recorded in meeting minutes, correspondence, and periodicals in the 1970s, was clearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
United Methodist Archive, Administrative Records of the Division of General Welfare of the General 
Board of Church and Society, RCAR Executive Committee 1974-1980, 1439-1-3:06). 
24 See United Methodist Archives, Administrative Records of the Division of World Peace of the General 
Board of Church and Society, Abortion Project 1973, 1441-7-8:03 
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focused on preventing Catholic leadership from exerting too strong of a force on politics, 
drawing a line in the sand that Catholics should not be able to enshrine their view of fetal 
life and abortion into United States law, and preserving religious mobilization in politics 
on the progressive side. 
 The view that the “opponents” for the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights 
were Catholics both provided energy to the movement from those that sought to oppose 
Catholic political power and constrained institutions and leaders that were seeking to 
build ecumenical ties with Catholics. A May 5, 1975 RCAR Executive Committee 
meeting discussed that the main problem in mobilizing religious groups was that 
“religious organizations...are placing abortion rights low on their list of priorities...because 
of ecumenical motivations--they don’t want to confront the Catholic Church on this 
issue.”25  
 Catholic opposition to abortion was particularly salient both to RCAR and to 
religious leaders during a campaign beginning in January 1974 to find clergy and 
religious leaders to officially lend their name to sponsor RCAR. Some religious leaders 
responded with great enthusiasm toward the cause, while others expressed deep moral 
concerns. Many who expressed deep moral concerns towards abortion nonetheless lent 
their name as sponsors because they believed that Catholic leadership should not define 
American law. In response to one United Methodist bishop with this stance, an RCAR 
leader wrote, “I assure you that your lack of enthusiasm at this point is no disqualification 
to your sponsorship of this cause. The focus is on the legal right.” In contrast, others were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See United Methodist Archive, Administrative Records of the Division of General Welfare of the General 
Board of Church and Society, RCAR Executive Committee 1974-1980, 1439-1-3:06. 
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unable to lend their name despite their strong support for abortion rights because of 
ecumenical concerns. One United Methodist Bishop apologized for not being able to 
sponsor, saying “it is unfortunate that we have such a sticky and potentially abrasive 
subject before us at a time when we are working more and more with Roman Catholic 
leadership.”26  By 1981, thousands of individuals had lent their name to sponsor RCAR’s 
message, hailing from many religious organizations, but most prominently from Mainline 
Protestant denominations (See Table 8). 
Table 8: Individual Sponsors of Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights in 198127 
Religious Institution Number of Sponsors 
(N=2786) 
United Presbyterian Church, USA 643 
United Methodist Church 475 
United Church of Christ 420 
Unitarian Universalist Association 219 
Central Conference of American Rabbis/Union of American 
Hebrew Congregations 
192 
United Synagogue of America/The Rabbinical Assembly 133 
Episcopal Church 130 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. (and Union Congregations) 97 
Lutheran Church in America 93 
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) 84 
American Baptist Churches, USA 82 
National Federation of Temple Sisterhood 37 
National Council of Jewish Women 34 
American Jewish Congress 22 
American Ethical Union 21 
Reformed Church in America 14 
Young Women’s Christian Association 9 
Additional Sponsors 81 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See United Methodist Archive, Administrative Records of the Devision of General Welfare of the 
General Board of Church and Society, RCAR-United Methodist Bishops’ Involvement 1973-1974, 1439-1-
3:08 
27 See United Methodist Church Archive. Religious Coalition on Abortion Rights 1976-1989. 1224-5-3:27 
102 
 
 Despite Mainline Protestants silence or condemnation toward abortion in the 
early-1960s, by the mid-1960s they provided key legitimacy and mobilization to the 
abortion rights movement and counterbalanced predominantly Catholic leadership 
opposition. During the 1960s and 1970s, the religious field was separated between pro-
abortion reform Protestants and Jews versus anti-abortion reform Catholics. Throughout 
the 1970s and into the early-1980s, the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights remained 
the primary vehicle for religious mobilization on abortion rights. The network remained 
primarily Mainline Protestant and Jewish and Catholics remained their primary 
“opponent.” These divides in the religious field were predominantly denominational. As 
Herberg (1955) found, whether one was a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew played a 
defining role in American’s public identities until the mid-century. As the history of 
abortion rights demonstrates, whether an institution or individual was Protestant, 
Catholic, or Jewish also played a defining role in their abortion stance in the 1960s 
through the 1970s. These denominational divides, however, would break down over the 
course of the 1980s as the religious field restructured. 
 
OPPONENT ON ABORTION RIGHTS SHIFTS TO EVANGELICAL PROTESTANTS 
 The nature of the debate about abortion changed for both RCAR and Mainline 
Protestant denominations as Evangelical Protestants joined Catholics on the anti-abortion 
side. Before the late 1970s, evangelical Protestants, while more opposed to abortion than 
most groups, were largely uninvolved in politics. In the late 1970s, however, evangelical 
Protestant groups and denominations became increasingly involved in American politics, 
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generally over social and moral issues (Wuthnow 1988). Opposition to abortion, in 
particular, became a primary rallying cry for Evangelical Protestant leaders and they used 
the issue to mobilize people at the grassroots (Bruce 1990; Diamond 1998). In part due to 
the efforts of key Evangelical leaders such as Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority, by the 
mid-1980s most Evangelical Protestants believed that a pro-life view was supported by 
God and was the traditional Christian stance (Harding 2000). While previously the 
religious fight around abortion was divided between pro-abortion-reform Mainline 
Protestants and Jews vs. anti-abortion Catholics, in the period starting in the late-1970s 
the religious fight around abortion increasingly cut within denominations between pro-
choice liberals and pro-life conservatives.  
 This mobilization of evangelicals represents a large shift for RCAR in who their 
primary opponent was in the abortion debate. In addition to predominantly Catholic 
right-to-life opponents, increasing numbers of evangelical Protestants entered the debate. 
Instead of conflict across the “strong boundary” between Mainline Protestants and 
Catholics, the conflict shifted over a more permeable boundary within Protestantism, a 
group that shares similar “cultural narrations” and social networks (Evans 1997: 464-
465). As Evans points out, these differing opponents altered the frames that were used by 
RCAR: “Unlike the more abstract arguments about the definition of human life used by 
the RCAR’s Roman Catholic adversaries of the 1970s, the frames of the evangelicals 
were focused on what most persons considered immoral abortion decisions by women: 
abortion for ‘convenience,’ gender selection, and ‘birth control,’ and abortion performed 
during the third trimester” (Evans 1997: 465).  
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 Many of these pro-life evangelicals came from traditionally evangelical 
denominations that had shifted. For example, Southern Baptist Convention passed an 
abortion reform stance in 1971, along with many other Mainline Protestant 
denominations at the time, arguing for abortion access “under such conditions as rape, 
incest, clear evidence of severe fetal deformity, and carefully ascertained evidence of the 
likelihood of damage to the emotional, mental, and physical health of the mother” 
(Southern Baptist Convention 1971). A Southern Baptist Convention D.C. representative 
even helped in the early days of RCAR formation in 1973.28 By 1980, however, the 
moderate leaders in the Southern Baptist Convention failed to maintain control against 
grassroots anti-abortion conservative forces within it, and passed a resolution calling for 
an constitutional amendment to ban abortion, with the only exception being to “save the 
life of the mother.”  
 Many of these newly politically mobilized Evangelical Protestants were part of 
existing Evangelical denominations, such as Southern Baptist Convention or Assemblies 
of God, or nondenominational churches. However, scholars have so far inadequately 
acknowledged how many of these newly politically mobilized and pro-life Evangelical 
Protestants came from within Mainline Protestant denominations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See July 3, 1973 memorandum, United Methodist Archives, Minutes and General Administrative 
Records of the General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church. Work on Abortion 
1973-1975, 1478-5-6:11. 
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RISE OF INTERNAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
 All Mainline Protestant denominations faced unofficial evangelical or pro-life 
organizations emerging internally, which sought to shift these pro-choice denominations 
to the right (See Table 9).  
Table 9: Evangelical Pro-Life Movements within Mainline Protestant Denominations  
Denomination Evangelical Pro-Life Movement 
American Baptist Churches in the 
U.S.A. 
Baptists for Life; American Baptist Friends of Life; 
Episcopal Church National Organization of Episcopalians for Life 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America 
Lutherans for Life 
Presbyterian Church (USA) Presbyterian Lay Committee; Presbyterians Pro-
Life 
United Church of Christ United Church People for Biblical Witness; 
United Church of Christ Friends for Life 
United Methodist Church Good News Movement; Methodist Task Force on 
Abortion and Sexuality 
 
All of the Mainline Protestant denominations experienced increasing tension and 
controversy as internal grassroots evangelical social movements argued that the 
denominational leadership was overly liberal and didn’t represent the beliefs of average 
denominational members. In particular, abortion was seen as the key issue that 
symbolized the ideological and political differences between denominational leadership 
and membership. Mainline Protestant general conferences and national meetings became 
much more contentious with votes during the 1980s and 1990s, challenging their pro-
choice positions and their RCAR membership, concern about these trends was discussed 
in a 1985 issue of Options, the RCAR’s main newsletter:  
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While RCAR is seeking to expand the base of support among groups not 
traditionally active on the issue, we must also work to network within our member 
denominations… [due to] efforts by anti-choice factions in their denominations to 
erode support for traditional pro-choice positions. ("Conference Highlights Role of 
Women as Moral Decision Makers" 1985: 4-5) 
 
United Methodist Church and the Good News Movement 
 The tension between the United Methodist Church and the Good News 
Movement, the key evangelical social movement organization within the United 
Methodist Church, provides a good illustration of the more general tension between 
liberal Mainline Protestant institutions and leadership and grassroots evangelical social 
movement organizations.  
 The Good News Movement began in 1967 and by the 1980s was credited with 
pushing liberal United Methodist bureaucracy to shift to the right on key issues. The 
movement was founded by Rev. Charles W. Keysor, who was agnostic until a 1959 Billy 
Graham crusade converted him and caused him to leave his public relations position and 
enter divinity school. He reported that he felt at odds with Methodism, feeling that “the 
Methodist Church needed to renew its historical Biblical beliefs” and that Methodism was 
dominated by humanists. He argued that the UMC emphasized “social issues ahead of 
worship” and was too lax about abortion (Vecsey 1979). In particular he had problems 
with the role of the women’s movement in the denomination. In 1974 he reportedly 
argued that high-level Methodist leaders have been worried about “pagan women’s 
libbers’ exerting influence in the 10-million-member denomination” and charged that 
“the church is a victim of a quota system under which women are appointed to leadership 
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positions solely because they are women,” although he refused to specify his sources for 
the claim (Religious News Service Bulletin, 11/11/74).  
 Abortion was a particular issue of concern for Rev. Keysor and the Good News 
Movement. He argued that, “The Church has taken a permissive position which allows 
abortion on demand…There is a deep feeling that the whole abortion thing is a deep 
issue and needs to be examined.”29 In a 1977 Good News pamphlet entitled “What 
About Abortion?’ with the drawing of a fetus on the cover, they provided guidance for 
readers who wanted to get involved by referring them to one’s “local chapter of Right to 
Life or the National Right to Life Committee.”  In the pamphlet they characterized Ms. 
Theresa Hoover, Associate General Secretary of Women’s Division Board of Global 
Ministries in UMC and a national sponsor of RCAR, as “a widely known pro-abortionist 
and denominational leader [who is allowed] to express the official position of the United 
Methodist Church.”30  
 The Good News movement argued that denominational leadership was too 
liberal and did not represent the beliefs of most in the denomination. For example, in one 
campaign the movement argued that the United Methodist Women’s group did not 
represent the needs and beliefs of most women in the denomination. It asserted that there 
was a divide between urban, liberal denominational leadership, which “officially speaks a 
language that is foreign to many women at the grassroots,” and women in congregations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See United Methodist Archive, Good News Debate 1974-1977, 2595-2-1:01. 
30 See United Methodist Archive, Good News Debate 1974-1977, 2595-2-1:01. 
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who felt “deeply dissatisfied because the official program emphasis of UM Women lacks 
practical, spiritual help.”31  
 In response, the denominational leadership characterized the constituency of the 
Good News movement as a very small but very vocal minority. The leadership disagreed 
forcefully with a Good News questionnaire that found widespread dissatisfaction with 
denominational leadership, pointing out that it only sampled from the Good News 
mailing list, which was seen as a severely biased sample. One letter between 
denominational leaders describing a “Good News” Kansas East Conference Rally 
mentioned: “I’m sure they were very disappointed at the attendance--under 40--and most 
of these were on the program in one way or another.”32 They were seen as using 
questionable tactics to push their agenda. For example when a task force of Good News 
called for the resignation of the entire staff of the Women’s Division of the UMC’s Board 
of Global Ministries for holding “Marxist views” and committing “spiritual treason” in 
regard to their China policies, they were called out by Methodist periodicals for a lack of 
evidence, resulting in their “repenting” for the statement while still calling for “dramatic 
changes” in the Women’s Division.33 
 Despite denominational leadership disdain and a lack of general support by 
mainstream Methodist periodicals, the Good News movement was credited in periodical 
articles with making United Methodist liberal stances on issues such as abortion more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See United Methodist Archive. Good News Abortion Debate Survey Folder 1, 2595-2-1:04 and Good 
News Abortion Debate Survey Folder 2, 2595-2-1:05. 
32 See United Methodist Archive, Good News Debate 1974-1977, 2595-2-1:01. 
33 See newspaper clipping in United Methodist Archive. Good News Abortion Debate Survey Folder 1. 
2595-2-1:04. 
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controversial and agitating for more conservative shifts. The Good News organization 
was credited with successfully pressing the General Conference to drop references to 
theological pluralism in 1988 from their Book of Discipline, which they had had since 1972 
(Guth et al. 1997: 37). A New York Times article reported that “the Good News evangelical 
movement...is shaking the United Methodist Church. The Good News emphasis on 
‘orthodox’ beliefs and spiritual renewal has become a major political force within the 
Methodist Church...and the same evangelical zeal is being expressed by groups within 
other Protestant denominations.” Rev. George McLain of New York, however, argued 
that this was more a political than a religious movement: “they claim they are just being 
religious, but their political and social views are typical of the ‘new right’” (Vecsey 1979). 
 While the United Methodist Church’s stance on abortion has not been as 
significantly altered as some other Mainline Protestant denominations’ stances, it has 
notably picked up the evangelical framing of abortion as convenience or birth control. In 
1988, the United Methodist Church added to its official stance: “We cannot affirm 
abortion as an acceptable means of birth control, and we unconditionally reject it as a 
means of gender selection.” More recently, in May 2012, the church added to this 
sentence that abortion was also not acceptable as a means of eugenics. Both the United 
Methodist Church’s General Board of Church and Society and their Women’s Division 
remain members of RCAR, although not without controversy and through quite narrow 
voting margins. In 1992, the General Conference defeated by 37 votes a motion that 
called for the withdrawal of the denomination’s Boards from RCAR. In 1996, they stayed 
in RCAR by a margin of 98 votes (497-399). In 2008, a much narrower margin of 32 
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votes (416-384) maintained the relationship. As Rev. Tracy Smith Malone, a delegate 
from Northern Illinois and a Board of Church and Society member said in justification, 
“it is important to stay at the interfaith table so our Social Principles can inform other 
denominations” (Gilbert 2008). 
 
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN LATER SHIFTS 
 Over the 1980s and early 1990s, there were strikingly similar situations for all 
Mainline Protestant institutions. All had internal evangelical social movements that 
sought to delegitimize the institution through arguing over the institution's abortion 
stance and sought to push the institution in a more pro-life direction. All experienced 
great internal controversy and challenge as the perceived “opponent” on the issue shifted 
from predominately Catholic to predominately Evangelical. In response, all Mainline 
Protestant denominations reexamined their stances to some degree from 1987-1992.  
 However, the institutions did vary in how much they moderated their stances on 
abortion and two groups crossed the line in the sand that had long stood between pro-
choice and pro-life camps: explicit support for choice or abortion on demand. Four of the 
Mainline Protestant institutions have added new stipulations or moral hesitations in their 
stances of abortion, but have maintained their historic support of choice on abortion. The 
Episcopal Church in 1988 added language that human life is sacred and that “all 
abortions [have] a tragic dimension,” but continues to “express its unequivocal opposition 
to any legislation...that abridges the right of a woman to reach an informed decision 
about the termination of pregnancy” (Episcopal Church 1989: 683). Presbyterian Church 
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(USA) in 1992, added greater moral hesitation, but “do not wish to seek laws enacted that 
would attach criminal penalties to” women who seek or doctors who perform abortions 
(Presbyterian Church (USA) 1992). United Church of Christ in 1987, added language 
about “the sacredness of all life,” but continues to affirm “a woman’s right to choose with 
respect to abortion” (United Church of Christ 1987: 82-83). The United Methodist 
Church in 1988, added that they “cannot affirm abortion as an acceptable means of birth 
control, and we unconditionally reject it as a means of gender selection,” but continue to 
“support the legal option of abortion under proper medical procedures by certified 
medical providers.” Two of the Mainline Protestant institutions backed off from their 
previous stance and no longer explicitly advocate for a woman’s right to choose. 
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. in 1988 became officially conflicted on 
abortion, saying that “we are divided as to the proper witness of the church to the state 
regarding abortion.”34 Evangelical Lutheran Church in America “neither supports nor 
opposes laws prohibiting abortion” (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 1991) For 
the first time since 1972, two solidly Mainline Protestant denominations no longer 
explicitly supported choice on abortion and instead became explicitly conflicted. 
 Differences in how institutions sought to navigate the boundary between 
themselves and Evangelical Protestants explain the variation in stances on abortion since 
the mid-1980s. These two institutions that shifted much more dramatically do not differ 
from the other denominations in the size or intensity of their internal social movement 
organizations or in their members’ abortion beliefs. There is one unique feature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See American Baptist Historical Society. Mary Mild’s Files, Women in the Church. Folder “Abortion 
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two Mainline Protestant institutions that moderated significantly that is not true of the 
four institutions that moderated only slightly. The denominations varied in how 
concerned they were about working with and building connections with Evangelical 
institutions, who increasingly replaced Catholics as the primary abortion rights opponent. 
The two institutions that no longer explicitly support choice on abortion are also the two 
institutions that have been building ecumenical ties that could lead to mergers and 
greater cooperation with large evangelical and pro-life institutions within their 
denominational family.  
 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 
 One of the institutions that shifted most dramatically on the issue of abortion is 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), in part due to its desire to ease 
conflict with Evangelicals in American Lutheranism, with whom they wanted to work for 
a united Lutheran church. American Lutheranism had dozens of Lutheran 
denominations in 1900 speaking many different languages, because Lutherans were 
primarily immigrants coming from different countries and going to different regions of 
the United States. After a series of mergers from 1917-1930 and again in the early 1960s, 
95% of Lutherans were part of just three different denominations, which all had roughly 
the same number of members.35  Two of the groups were Mainline Protestant 
denominations (American Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in America), and, 
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along with all other Mainline Protestant denominations, both supported choice on the 
issue of abortion in 1970. The third, Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod (LC-MS), is 
generally considered an Evangelical Protestant denomination and has been anti-abortion 
since 1971 (Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod Commission on Theology and Church 
Relations 1971) and passed statements condemning abortion at every synodical 
conference from 1975 to 1989 (Wilke 1990). As Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod 
became increasingly politicized in conservative and Republican politics (Burkee 2013), 
abortion rose as the primary issue that Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod actively 
encouraged social action on by members (Wilke 1990). After the 1988 merger between 
American Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in America, there remain two primary 
Lutheran churches in the United States: the Mainline Protestant ELCA and the 
Evangelical Protestant LC-MS.  
 Throughout the twentieth century, there was an “urge to merge” within 
American Lutheranism and most believed “that a single, unified Lutheran church in 
North America would be a glorious thing” (Granquist 2013: 20). Franklin Clark Fry, a 
president of the United Lutheran Church from 1944-1962 and named “Mr. Protestant” 
by Time magazine when he was featured on their cover in 1958, argued forcefully for 
American Lutheran unity. He argued that they already largely agreed with one another 
and that: 
A unified Lutheran Church in America would honor and glorify its Savior with 
immensely increased effectiveness through a united testimony. The impact of the 
true Gospel upon Protestant life and thought in this pivotal western world would 
be strengthened mightily…Keeping American Lutheranism frozen in its present 
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divisions in these explosive, fermenting days for Christian faith cannot be in 
accordance with the divine will. (Fry 1949) 
 
John Tietjen, a prominent leader and voice in the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, 
also saw Lutheran union as an imperative and that “a divided Lutheranism, like a divided 
Christendom, is an offense that weakens our missionary message, contradicts our witness 
to the Christ as one who reconciles and unites, and bars some from entering the 
Kingdom of God” (Tietjen 1966: 154). Starting in 1967, the three primary Lutheran 
denominations institutionalized their cooperative efforts through the Lutheran Council in 
the United States of America. All three denominations saw Lutheran unity as important, 
overdue, and inevitable despite some opposition primarily from Lutheran Church—
Missouri Synod conservatives (Nelson 1975). 
 Abortion proved to be an important wedge issue affecting Lutheran mergers. 
American Lutheran Church, one of the Mainline groups, increasingly stepped a little to 
the right on abortion over the 1970s. During this time, the American Lutheran Church 
was also working with Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod, the pro-life Lutheran group, to 
create greater ties and a potential merger. In fact, the president of the American 
Lutheran Church from 1973-1988, David Preus, was even a cousin of the president of the 
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, Jack Preus. Although they did not agree with one 
another on many issues, they maintained a close relationship (Preus 2011). However, 
conservatives in the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod provided strong opposition to 
attempts at greater union and merging, with the strong opposition to abortion in LC-MS 
and the moderate pro-choice stance in the American Lutheran Church proving a point of 
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discord. In contrast, the more liberal Lutheran Church in America did not work as hard 
to create ties with Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod and did not moderate their 
abortion stance over the 1970s and early 1980s as the American Lutheran Church did. 
The relationship between the two Mainline Protestant and pro-choice Lutheran groups, 
the more moderate American Lutheran Church and the more liberal Lutheran Church 
in America, proved easier.  
 Finally, in 1988, these two Mainline Protestant denominations merged to form the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. When Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America merged in 1983, they also tried to bring Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod into 
it, but the negotiations fell through. However, a small splinter group did come off the 
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod and join the merger: the Association of Evangelical 
Lutheran Churches. The Lutheran groups retained hope that eventually all Lutheran 
groups would come together, although there was a sense that “the gulf between [the 
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod] and the others appears to widen with the merger” 
(Lyles 1987: 462). 
 By 1991, the newly-merged Evangelical Lutheran Church in America came out 
with a conflicted stance on abortion, supporting abortion access under extreme 
circumstances, as was typical in pre-Roe v. Wade abortion law reform stances (Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America 1991). However, they neither supported nor opposed laws 
that sought to prohibit abortion on demand. For the first time since 1972, a Mainline 
Protestant denomination had an explicitly abortion reform stance, supporting access to 
abortion in cases of rape, incest, and fetal deformity but not opposing laws that sought to 
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prohibit all other abortions.  Today, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America maintains 
this 1991 stance and is no longer an explicit supporter of a woman’s right to choose, 
unlike most Mainline Protestant groups.  
 
American Baptist Churches 
 The other Mainline Protestant group that no longer explicitly supports choice and 
shifted even further than Evangelical Lutheran Church in America on abortion is the 
American Baptist Churches. The American Baptist Churches in the USA was perhaps 
the strongest abortion rights movement denomination before Roe v. Wade. American 
Baptists were the most prominent denomination represented in the Clergy Consultation 
Service on Abortion, helping connect women to abortion providers before 1973, and was 
the first among Mainline Protestants to come out with an abortion repeal statement in 
1968. The American Baptist Churches then went on to become founding members of 
RCAR in 1973. However, by 1985 the denomination ended its membership with RCAR, 
citing constituent pressure (Jenks 1988). In 1988, the denomination voted by a wide 
margin (161-9-2) to become officially conflicted on the issue of abortion, neither pro-life 
nor pro-choice, a conflicted stance they have maintained since.  
 Today, American Baptist Churches is leaning even more in the pro-life direction 
than Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.  They are also even more concerned with 
evangelical connections. Unlike all other Mainline Protestant groups, American Baptists 
face a much larger evangelical and pro-life denomination within their denominational 
family, the Southern Baptist Convention, which is the largest denomination in the United 
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States after Catholics.36 American Baptists and Southern Baptists actually had split into 
Northern and Southern wings around the time of the Civil War. Other religious 
institutions also split into northern and southern wings during the Civil War, such as 
Presbyterians and Methodists, but both of those groups re-merged together during the 
late twentieth century. The Baptists had not re-merged, but there remains hope among 
many that they still might. Like Mainline Protestants, Southern Baptists supported 
abortion law reform in 1971, but became increasingly conservative during the rise of the 
religious right and by 1981 became explicitly pro-life, advocating for the criminalization 
of abortion except to prevent the death of the woman. Mainline Protestant American 
Baptists, as they have sought to merge and create greater institutional connections with 
the Evangelical Southern Baptist Convention, have also sought to be a “bridge 
denomination” between Mainline and Evangelical Protestants. This ecumenism with 
evangelicals was a key mover of the American Baptist abortion stance:   
On ecumenical relations, a special commission concluded a four-year scrutiny of 
the National and World Councils of Churches by recommending to the board 
that the ABC stay in both councils but also take the novel step of becoming an 
official observer at the National Association of Evangelicals--a move that, 
according to commission chairman William Keucher, would enable the ABC to 
be a ‘bridge denomination’ between the conciliar movement and the evangelical 
world. A decision on the proposal is not due until December, but the board’s 
initial response was highly favorable. Like the abortion statement, the plan struck 
many as a creative way for the ABC to heal its divisions and acknowledge its 
diversity. (Heim 1988: 660) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In 1971, American Baptist Churches had 1.6 million members and Southern Baptist Convention had 
11.8 million members (Jacquct 1973). In 2010, American Baptist Churches had 1.3 million members and 
16 million members (Lindner 2012). 
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Their shift on abortion from pro-choice to officially conflicted was seen as an important 
step in this move to being a bridge denomination. For example, the American Baptist 
Convention’s newly elected general secretary in 1988, the year they shifted, welcomed the 
change, saying that it demonstrated that the institution: “believes in ecumenical 
cooperation in all directions” and that they were “serious about both influencing the 
[Mainline] and reaching out to evangelicals.” This plan to remain in the middle ground 
of increasingly polarized Protestantism was seen as potentially dangerous by some 
American Baptists:  
Being a ‘bridge denomination,’ like being a diverse denomination, has its risky 
aspects, as American Baptists well know. What happens, in this case, if the two 
poles of American Protestantism that they are trying to link move further apart? 
In the upbeat mood of this meeting, however, such concerns were not prominent. 
American Baptists seemed satisfied that for the time being they were finding ways 
to affirm both their diversity and their identity, perhaps even to thrive, not just 
survive, in the embattled middle ground of American Protestantism. (Heim 1988: 
661-662) 
 
Less Evangelical Ecumenicism, Less Shifting 
 All the other Mainline Protestant institutions also moderated their abortion 
stances from 1987-1992, adding new stipulations and moral hesitation to their stances. 
They all experienced great internal controversy and internal social movement pressure as 
evangelicals mobilized within them and challenged their institutional legitimacy through 
the issue of abortion. However, despite these pressures, they have maintained their 
support of choice on the issue of abortion.  None had a large evangelical institution within 
their denominational families that could provide competition or that they sought to 
merge with. Those Mainline Protestant institutions that did not seek to build greater 
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connections with Evangelical institutions moderated only slightly, but remained firm in 
supporting choice on abortion, despite great controversy over the decision. They instead 
sought to remain solidly Mainline, despite Evangelicals within the denomination that 
threatened their legitimacy.  
 
Homogeneity in Shifting, Variety in Degree 
 All of the Mainline Protestant institutions reexamined their stances in a short 
period of time from 1987-1992 and all moderated their stance to some degree. The 
striking homogeneity of timing of these shifts demonstrates significant pressure within the 
organizational field to reexamine the issue of abortion and that the legitimate and 
rational stance for mainstream Protestant institutions in 1987-1992 was slightly more 
conservative than it was in the earlier time period. 
 All Mainline Protestant institutions experienced great controversy over abortion 
as the key “opponent” on the issue shifted from predominately Catholic to predominately 
Evangelical Protestant. Instead of conflict over the clear boundary between Protestants 
and Catholics, the conflict was over a more flexible boundary within Protestantism, 
between Evangelical and Mainline Protestants. All Mainline Protestant institutions had 
evangelicals challenge their legitimacy and seek to shift them conservatively on the issue 
of abortion.  
 However, the Mainline Protestant institutions that also sought to build greater 
connections with Evangelical institutions shifted more dramatically in their abortion 
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stance and backed away from supporting choice. Those Mainline Protestant institutions 
that did not seek to build greater connections with Evangelical institutions moderated 
only slightly, but remained firm in supporting choice on abortion, despite great 
controversy over the decision. They instead sought to remain solidly Mainline, despite 
Evangelicals within the denomination that threatened their legitimacy. 
  
DISCUSSION  
Prominent scholars have argued that the American religious shifted from salient 
boundaries primarily between different religious groups (Protestants, Catholics and 
Jewish) to having increasingly salient boundaries between religious conservatives and 
liberals (commonly thought of as the “culture war”). This religious realignment occurred 
for a number of reasons, especially the differential expansion of higher education, the 
growth of the federal government and the proliferation of religious “special purpose 
groups” (Wuthnow 1988). With this religious restructuring, the middle has collapsed, 
leading to a growing divide between liberals and conservatives and large denominations 
have grown more internally polarized. Indeed the history of abortion rights bears out 
these trends. Whether an institution was Protestant, Catholic or Jewish played a defining 
role in their abortion stance in the 1960s through the 1970s. Over the 1980s, abortion 
proved increasingly contentious, Mainline Protestant institutions struggled to maintain 
internal cohesion, and the salient divide was between conservatives and liberals within 
denominations.  
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I argue that the issue of abortion has provided fertile ground upon which religious 
groups have negotiated understandings of the boundaries between themselves and others 
and debated about the role of religion in American public life, becoming a key site where 
religious restructuring has occurred. In the late-1960s and 1970s, Mainline Protestants 
drew a boundary between themselves and Catholics by emphasizing their liberal abortion 
stances and Catholic conservative stances. They fought over abortion laws as a way of 
fighting Catholic political power more broadly. With Evangelical Protestants increasingly 
embracing pro-life activism in the 1980s, differences in abortion beliefs increasingly split 
Mainline Protestant denominations, with some arguing for a continued commitment to 
abortion rights and others arguing for new pro-life stances. Evangelical Protestants fought 
over abortion as a way of fighting more broadly to push the role of religion in politics 
from progressive to conservative. Mainline Protestant denominational leadership fought 
to maintain the historic liberal influence of their denominations by fighting to maintain 
their abortion stances.  
Contentious issues, especially abortion, have provided the key site for religious 
institutions to renegotiate religious boundaries. In the 1960s and 1970s, Protestants allied 
themselves with Jewish groups over pro-choice politics against Catholics who were 
mobilized over pro-life politics. Starting in the 1980s, liberal Protestants, liberal Catholics, 
and liberal Jews teamed up over pro-choice politics and conservative Protestants, 
conservative Catholics, and conservative Jews teamed up over pro-life politics.  Religious 
boundaries shifted through arguments over contentious and salient social issues. Abortion 
fights did not cause the religious realignment, but rather Wuthnow (1988) explains the 
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key underlying structural forces that contributed to this shift. Rather, these abortion fights 
allowed the shifting boundaries to become salient to people and provided the institutional 
connections and rationale for shifting the boundaries. Wuthnow (1988) has explained why 
religious realignment occurred, and this chapter provides a key explanation for how 
religious realignment occurred. 
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CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE CULTURE WARS 
 
 There has been large attention paid by sociologists, political scientists, pundits and 
laypeople alike to the relationship between religion and politics and concern that there 
are widening divides in beliefs between liberals and conservatives. This divide has been 
termed the “culture war” ever since James Davison Hunter declared “that America is in 
the midst of a culture war that has had and will continue to have reverberations not only 
within public policy but within the lives of ordinary Americans everywhere” (Hunter 
1991: 34). Although Hunter coined the idea, Pat Buchanan popularized this frame at the 
1992 Republican National Convention. Buchanan spoke forcefully of division in his 
prime-time convention speech, arguing that “there is a religious war going on in our 
country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we 
will one day be as was the Cold War itself”  (qtd in Edidin 2004: 4). Many pundits today 
portray abortion as the quintessential culture war issue, describing the debate as 
polarizing and enduring and Protestants, in particular, as culture warriors in pro-life 
politics (i.e. Steinfels 2008; Douthat 2012; Edsall 2014). Pundits and scholars alike have 
argued that divergent views on abortion emerge out of fundamental differences in 
worldview and sources of moral authority, with those whose worldview centers around 
God supporting pro-life politics (Luker 1984; Hunter 1991). 
 This dissertation challenges some of these popular assumptions about the politics 
of abortion and sheds light on culture war issues and religious restructuring in the United 
States over time. By examining large, mainstream, and moderate Protestant institutions 
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rather than activists in the debate, I find much consensus, change over time, ambiguity, 
and often ambivalence toward abortion. I find that these stances have often emerged not 
out of existing worldview and attitudes, but rather out of existing social networks, 
awareness of stances by others in the religious field, and institutional self-interest. 
 In Chapter 1, I examined Protestant clergy mobilization in the early abortion 
rights movement, before Roe v. Wade decriminalized the procedure. I sought to 
understand why Protestants were willing to put significant time, energy, and personal risk 
into expanding abortion access for women in the late-1960s and early-1970. I found that 
Protestant clergy were pulled into mobilization in abortion rights movements through 
existing activist social networks, particularly from the Civil Rights Movement. Many of 
these clergy were pulled in not by their existing attitudes toward abortion, by rather by 
their social networks and attitudes towards other issues such as civil rights, social injustice, 
and civil disobedience. This chapter challenges common assumptions that Protestant 
stances on abortion are naturally conservative or static. 
 Chapter 2 shifts focus from the Protestant clergy to the Protestant denominations 
that they were a part of. I find that official Mainline Protestant denominational stances on 
abortion have shifted much over time. However, I also find significant homogeneity and 
consensus among all the Mainline protestant institutions. In the early-1960s, no Mainline 
Protestant institutions supported expanding abortion access. Over 1966-1972, all the 
same institutions released official pronouncements in support of expanding abortion 
access. Since this time, particularly from 1987-1992, all these institutions faced increased 
internal debate over the issue and shifted in conservative directions. I find that debate 
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around abortion among Mainline Protestant institutions was not characterized by 
polarization around two sides. Rather the debate was characterized by gray area, 
consensus, and shifts in beliefs. However, I also find that consensus around abortion 
politics declined over the 1980s and conflict arose within and among the denominations.  
 Chapter 3 explores this conflict that arose in the 1980s in greater detail. I argue 
that stances on abortion within denominations are determined with an awareness of 
stances of other religious denominations and institutional self-interest. During the early 
abortion rights movement, Mainline Protestant institutions mobilized around support for 
expanding abortion rights as a way of challenging Catholic institutions, who were the 
primary opponent to expanding abortion access. Over the 1980s, as Evangelical 
Protestants became increasingly engaged in pro-life politics, Mainline Protestants began 
to see them as the primary opponent to expanding abortion access. Those denominations 
that sought to create greater ties with Evangelical Protestant institutions within their 
denominational families backed away from their support of choice on abortion. Those 
denominations that were not concerned with large Evangelical institutions within their 
denominational families remained supportive of choice on abortion despite strong 
grassroots movements within them to withdraw that support. 
 This dissertation supports scholars who challenge popular conceptions of a culture 
war in the United States (Williams 1997; Wolfe 1998; DiMaggio 2003). Although this 
idea of a culture war polarizing Americans is a popular one, the majority of empirical 
research finds that Americans are not deeply polarized at the individual-level (Davis and 
Robinson 1996; DiMaggio et al. 1996; Hoffmann and Miller 1998; McConkey 2001).  
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The stronger case appears to be that the United States is not as polarized as many 
assume, but rather much more moderate on the whole.  DiMaggio (2003) finds that on 
every important between-group dimension, except for party identification, Americans 
have become more unified in their individual-level social attitudes at the same time that 
public politics have become increasingly polarized. Of this paradox, DiMaggio (2003) 
concludes:  
If by culture war we mean polarization of attitudes, then the culture war is a myth.  
But if we understand it as a campaign to construct new forms of political identity 
and define the terms of political engagement, then it warrants our close attention. 
In fact, the culture war is both of these things, an effective myth that has shaped 
the public’s understanding of the issues that divide it, making some identities more 
salient and others less accessible, and connecting the former to a galvanizing 
trope. (DiMaggio 2003: 94) 
 
Williams (1997: 291) has a similar understanding of the culture war: “This is where 
conflict is happening: not between abstract world views, but between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ 
constructed through a host of cues such as race, life-style, education, and other identity 
markers. The dynamic of conflict is located between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ because we are ‘us’ 
and they are ‘them.’” Instead of investigating the culture war at the level of individual 
beliefs and worldview, more scholarship should focus on the culture war at this level of 
institutions, social networks, and identities, as this dissertation does. 
 I have sought to highlight the culture war and polarization over abortion as not 
fixed or inevitable, but rather as a continually renegotiated process. Stances on abortion 
have not emerged simply out of religious beliefs, but have changed over time along with 
changes in religious boundaries. Whereas before the 1960s salient religious identities were 
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based on whether one was Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, after the 1960s salient religious 
boundaries increasingly cut across denominational lines and were defined by whether one 
was politically liberal or conservative. This religious restructuring has occurred through 
an active process of arguing over contentious and salient social issues, including abortion. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Protestants created alliances with Jewish groups in support of 
abortion rights in opposition to Catholics who were staunchly anti-abortion. The salient 
religious divides between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews were salient and rationalized by 
religious leaders and institutions by pointing to the salient divisions in the abortion 
debate. Increasingly over the 1980s, liberal Protestants, liberal Catholics, and liberal Jews 
allied over pro-choice politics and conservative Protestants, conservative Catholics, and 
conservative Jews allied over pro-life politics. This new primary divide between liberals 
and conservative occurred because abortion debates provided the rationale and 
connections between new institutions and made this new politically-based religious divide 
increasingly salient to people and institutions. Abortion debates among large, mainstream 
religious institutions provided a key platform for the processes of religious realignment 
and the creation of the modern culture war.  
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